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Introduction
Mail delivery is one of the few economic activities that has avoided the
wave of deregulation and privatization that has swept network industries over
the past two decades. Nonetheless, postal services throughout the world are
receiving critical reexamination, not only because of the technological
developments that appear to be changing the essential character of
communications, but also because of a growing body of experience and
scholarly research concerning the regulation and public ownership of
enterprise. Such experience and research now provides policymakers with a
better understanding than they had a generation or more ago of the costs and
benefits of the existing way in which postal services are produced.' This
Article builds on that experience and research by examining the following
questions concerning the business activities of Canada Post Corporation
(Canada Post) in a competitive environment: What should be the appropriate
mandate of Canada Post? In particular, is Canada Post a natural monopoly
and, if so, what form of regulation would best serve Canadian consumers? If
the delivery of letter mail is not a natural monopoly, what basis exists for
retaining Canada Post's current statutory monopoly? What potential exists for
Canada Post to abuse its statutory monopoly-and other statutory privileges
and immunities-to compete unfairly against efficient private suppliers of
postal services?
Canada Post's "exclusive privilege" to provide letter mail protects
Canada Post from competition in that particular market. Public ownership
and control exempt Canada Post's actions from the corporate governance that
is characteristic of private enterprises. Despite repeated findings that Canada
Post does not take advantage of its autonomy and letter mail monopoly to
subsidize its entry and expansion into competitive markets, such as parcel
post and express mail, the existence of a government-owned monopoly that
may participate in competitive markets perpetuates the potential for such
abuse and raises a fundamental issue: whether Parliament's grant of a mo-
nopoly to Canada Post over the delivery of letter mail should be used to
restrict or supplant private commerce in other markets. Even if no cross-
subsidization or predatory pricing ever occurs, Canada Post clearly has an
advantage over its competitors because it has in place a government-nurtured,
nationwide delivery system that may yield synergies from the joint provision
1. See, e.g., J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING COMPETITION FROM THE
POSTAL MONOPOLY (1996).
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of other communication, transportation, and delivery services. This Article
examines the justifications for Canada Post's publicly protected postal
monopoly and public ownership and control. The economic and legal analysis
presented demonstrates that the extension of the postal monopoly into
competitive markets should be prevented or, conversely, Canada Post's
statutory monopoly over letter mail should be abolished and open competition
in all communications services should be allowed.
Public provision of an essential service can be justified economically if
policy makers can identify a market failure that prevents private provision of
the service and if they can discern an important advantage that the
government has in providing the service. Proponents of the public provision
of letter mail by Canada Post, however, have failed to identify any such
market failure. Postal services are far from being "public goods" because
costs are sensitive to volumes, congestion externalities in production are
present, and customer access can easily be excluded. Moreover, pricing of
delivery services rations access to postal services, as it does with any privately
provided product or service. The absence of market failure is also evident
from the extensive services that private carriers of parcel post, express mail,
and package delivery provide. The presence of multiple substitutes for public
postal services-including telecommunications and facsimile, electronic mail,
private carriers, and transportation-effectively mitigates any losses that
might arise from some government advantage, however unlikely such an
advantage may be.
The market failure that typically is used to justify public control of entry,
although not necessarily public provision of a service, is that the market
cannot achieve cost savings from natural monopoly. This discussion
demonstrates that, although there may be some economies of scale and scope
in postal delivery services, those economies are far from sufficient to argue
for a protected monopoly for the services. Even if there were such a
monopoly, firms providing the delivery of letter mail could be privately
owned, as are public utilities.
The same reasons that favor private over public provision of postal
services apply to the question of whether the government should compete
with the private sector for providing those services. If the private sector can
provide the services, there is no role for government in the market as supplier.
Moreover, when the expansion of government provision of such services
interferes with private provision, thus reducing opportunities for private
concerns to recover their investments, government supply of postal services
represents a taking of private property by interfering with ongoing com-
mercial concerns.
Part I of this Article outlines the regulatory and institutional setting in
which Canada Post operates, including the nature and extent of Canada Post's
legal monopoly. Part II demonstrates why technological justifications for the
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postal monopoly are no longer valid. Part Ill establishes that public provision
of the full range of postal services is no longer needed. Analogizing to
experiences of the U.S. Postal Service, Part IV explains how postal pricing
and regulation can cause competitive problems for private firms because of
incorrect measurement and misallocation of attributable costs and because of
the potential to misuse Ramsey pricing principles.
Part V presents four options that are available to Parliament for
addressing the problem of protecting efficient competition from the postal
monopoly. The first is for Parliament simply to acquiesce to Canada Post's
current pattern of empire building. The second is to privatize Canada Post.
The third is to commercialize Canada Post; that is, to turn Canada Post into a
publicly-owned business free of any statutory privileges or burdens relative to
private firms. The fourth is to allow Canada Post to retain its exclusive
privilege and all other statutory privileges and burdens, but to subject it to far
more rigorous public oversight. Commercialization may be the most attractive
option because it is politically feasible and would appreciably enhance eco-
nomic welfare.
The concern with protecting efficient competition from the postal
monopoly figures prominently in the recently released report of the Canada
Post Mandate Review (Review).2 In fact, the Review recommends withdrawal
of Canada Post from "competition with the private sector in areas of activity
outside its core public policy responsibilities for providing postal services."3
Specifically, the Review finds "that the competitive activities of Canada Post,
based as they are on the foundation of the corporation's exclusive privilege
and of the network it has built with public funds, are incompatible with basic
principles of fairness."4 It further finds "that the emphasis on competitive
activities has distorted Canada Post's corporate culture and behaviour,
diverting it away from a focus on the public service and public policy
responsibilities that are the reasons for its existence." 5 Moreover, the Review
notes that the corporation's diversification into competitive markets has failed
to produce financial gains.6
Even though the Review's recommendation charts a course significantly
different from the one on which Canada Post currently is embarked, the
rationale behind the recommendations essentially is devoid of economic
analysis regarding the costs and benefits of regulated state monopolies. In
contrast, this Article explicitly relies on economic analysis in examining
Canada Post's participation in competitive markets.
2. THE REPORT OF THE CANADA POST MANDATE REvIEW, THE FUrIURE OF CANADA POST
CORPORATION 86 (July 1996) [hereinafter MANDATE REvIEW].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 77.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 77-78.
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1. The Existing Regulation of Canada Post
After operating for more than a century as a department of the federal
government, Canada's Post Office Department was converted in 1981 into a
federal Crown corporation, thus establishing Canada Post Corporation.7 To
ensure the continued viability of the organization, Parliament bestowed upon
Canada Post a collection of privileges and immunities that make it unique
among Canada's economic enterprises. Canada Post is wholly owned by the
Canadian government, 8 operates under a mandate to provide postal service to
the entire country,9 is obligated to serve similar communities in like manner,10
and is, for the most part, free to set its own prices." Like other Canadian
corporations, Canada Post can issue debt,' 2 is authorized to pay dividends to
its shareholders,' 3 and is subject to the federal income tax. 14 Closer scrutiny,
however, reveals that Canada Post is privileged with regard to those burdens
as well. Finally, unlike any other Canadian corporation, Canada Post has a
statutory monopoly over letter mail.' 5
The effectiveness of existing legal and regulatory barriers to entry into
mail delivery is evident. Canada Post is very large. In terms of sales, Canada
Post ranks in the top fifty of Canada's largest companies.' 6 With annual sales
for fiscal year (FY) 1994-95 reaching $4.7 billion, Canada Post ranks
significantly above other large Canadian communications companies, such as
British Columbia Telephone, Teleglobe, and Rogers Communications. 7
Despite its size and privileged status, Canada Post is not very profitable. In
terms of net income Canada Post ranks well below the top 500 Canadian
companies.18 It has earned a profit in only five of its fourteen years of
existence; it suffered a net loss of $69 million in FY 1994-95 and $270
million in FY 1993-94.19
7. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 4 (1985) (Can.).
8. CANADA POST CORP., 1995-1996 TO 1999-2000 CORPORATE PLAN / 1995-1996 CAPITAL
BUDGET 13 (1995) [hereinafter CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN].





14. PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, A STRATEGIC REVIEW OF PROGRESSIVE POSTAL ADMINISTRATIONS:
COMPETITION, COMMERCIALIZATION, AND DEREGULATION 13 (1995) [hereinafter PRICE WATERHOUSE
STRATEGIC REVIEW].
15. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 14 (1985) (Can.).
16. The Corporate 500, CAN. Bus., June 1993, at 69, 70.
17. Id.; CANADA POST CORP., 1994-1995 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1995) [hereinafter CANADA PoST
ANNUAL REPORT]. Throughout this Article, all currency is in Canadian Dollars unless otherwise
indicated.
18. The Corporate 500, supra note 16, at 70.
19. Canada Post Corp., Corporate Overview, Jun. 1996, available in INTERNET (enter
"www.mailposte.ca/english/overview/overview.html#profile"); CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 17, at 35.
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Canada Post serves more than twenty-eight million Canadians, more than
900,000 businesses and public institutions, numerous international customers,
and more than 200 postal administrations around the globe.20 With more than
62,500 full- and part-time employees, a fleet of more than 6,000 vehicles, and
twenty-three major mail processing plants, Canada Post handles more than
eleven billion messages and parcels per year. 21 It serves its customers through
approximately 18,500 retail points of access. 22
A. The Mandate
To assess the current circumstances of Canada Post and its plans for the
future, one must understand the statutory objectives that were established for
the company by Parliament. Under its mandate, as codified in the Canada
Post Corporation Act (CPCA) of 1981, Canada Post is obligated:
(a) to establish and operate a postal service for the collection,
transmission and delivery of messages, information, funds and goods
both within Canada and between Canada and places outside Canada;
(b) to manufacture and provide such products and to provide
such services as are, in the opinion of the Corporation, necessary or
incidental to the postal service provided by the Corporation; and
(c) to provide to or on behalf of departments and agencies of,
and corporations owned, controlled or operated by, the Government
of Canada or any provincial, regional or municipal government in
Canada or to any person services that, in the opinion of the
Corporation, are capable of being conveniently provided in the
course of carrying out the other objects of the Corporation.23
Canada Post is bound to fulfill those objectives while giving due
consideration to the following:
(a) the desirability of improving and extending its products and
services in the light of developments in the field of communications;
(b) the need to conduct its operations on a self-sustaining
financial basis while providing a standard of service that will meet
the needs of the people of Canada and that is similar with respect to
communities of the same size;
(c) the need to conduct its operations in such manner as will best
provide for the security of mail;
20. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 5 (1985) (Can.).
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(d) the desirability of utilizing the human resources of the
Corporation in a manner that will both attain the objects of the
Corporation and ensure the commitment and dedication of its
employees to the attainment of those objects; and
(e) the need to maintain a corporate identity program approved
by the Governor in Council that reflects the role of the Corporation as
an institution of the Government of Canada.
24
Thus, Canada Post is obligated to operate a nationwide postal service and is
authorized to offer all services that are "necessary or incidental" to fulfilling
that objective. That mandate is particularly broad in scope when one reads it
in conjunction with the forward-looking provision (a) immediately above,
which suggests the possibility that Canada Post must provide emerging
communications services, such as e-mail and remote desktop publishing.
1. The Social Mandate
Canada Post's mandate addresses two aspects of postal service that are
often cited as support for public ownership of postal enterprises: security of
the mail and universal service. Although Canada Post must act to ensure the
integrity of the mail stream, experience from the United States suggests that
public ownership is not necessarily the best way to accomplish that goal.
With respect to the second social goal, primarily because of the country's
geographic expanse and its disparate population densities, Canada Post
provides a modified form of universal service by providing like services for
communities of similar sizes. Canada Post also offers letter mail at uniform
rates, even though no statutory mandate requires it to do so.25
2. The Financial Mandate
Canada Post's mandate is clearly flexible in its operation. Although the
mandate explicitly states that Canada Post is to be self-sustaining, the
enterprise was not so for its first seven years of existence. With regard to
financial viability, the CPCA operates in conjunction with other laws. As a
Crown corporation, Canada Post is subject to the Financial Administration
Act (FAA). Under section 3(5) of the FAA, Canada Post "must not be
ordinarily dependent upon appropriations for operating purposes, must
ordinarily earn a return on equity and must have a reasonable expectation of
paying dividends." 26 Until 1988, however, Canada Post was permitted to use
24. Id.
25. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 14.
26. CANADA POST CORP., CANADA POST CORPORATION: COMPETITION AND REGULATION 14
(1995) [hereinafter COMPETITION AND REGULATION).
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federal funds to cover the deficit when it operated at a loss. 2 7 All funds that
Canada Post received in that manner were to be "reimbursed to the Minister
of Finance from the annual revenues of the Corporation in so far as such
revenues [were] sufficient., 28 Since 1988, Canada Post has been financially
self-sufficient in the sense that it has "no access to government funds or
capital for operating shortfalls.,
29
Nevertheless, Canada Post still benefits from its government ownership.
It may borrow directly from the federal government. 30 It also may borrow
private capital at rates more favorable than its private competitors can obtain
because its debt is backed by the full faith and credit of the Canadian
government.
31
Parliament also has nurtured Canada Post with certain tax advantages.
Until FY 1994-95, Canada Post paid no federal income taxes, even when it
earned positive net income,32 because it is exempt from such taxes. On March
27, 1994, however, the enterprise "became a prescribed Crown Corporation
for tax purposes and as such is subject to federal income taxation under Part I
of the Income Tax Act."33 Canada Post also enjoys the benefit of consolidated
tax loss carry-forwards in the amount of $320,000,000, which are available to
reduce future income taxes and will not expire until 2002.34 Despite having
$4.7 billion in revenue, Canada Post paid only $5 million in taxes for FY
1994-95; by 2000, it expects to generate $5.83 billion in revenue and have a
tax liability of only $19 million.35
Canada Post is authorized to issue shares and pay dividends. That aspect
of corporate governance, however, has not put Canada Post on equal ground
with private Canadian corporations. Rather, it has highlighted the unique
status of the enterprise. In 1993, Parliament amended the CPCA to authorize
Canada Post to issue as many shares as it sees fit. The amendment is of little
practical effect, however, because the government currently owns all the
shares in Canada Post and will always hold all voting rights under the present
statutory scheme. The amendment does allow Canada Post to issue up to 10
percent of all outstanding shares to its employees3 6 and authorizes Canada
Post to declare and pay dividends. 37 Again, that provision is of little practical
effect apart from the possibility that someday employee shareholders may
receive a dividend. According to Price Waterhouse, Canada Post "pays
27. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 31(1985) (Can.).
28. § 32.
29. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 17.
30. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 29 (1985) (Can.).
31. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 17.
32. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 35.
33. Id. at31.
34. id.
35. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 11.
36. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 28 (1985) (Can.)
37. Id.
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dividends to the government when it earns a positive net income; .. .[t]he
last time it paid a dividend was in FY 1992-1993."38 In its projected
statement of income and retained earnings, however, Canada Post estimates
positive net income over the next three years but accounts for no dividends
until 1999. 39 Canada Post has indicated in its projected balance sheet that it
may issue its first shares to employees in 1999.40
Finally, the government gives many direct subsidies to Canada Post. The
federal government pays Canada Post for "publications, Parliamentary mail,
literature for the blind, and the shipment of food and similar items to the
North."4' In 1994, the federal government compensated Canada Post $114.9
million for foregone revenue from those sources.42 Yet, the most significant
subsidy-the one that sets Canada Post apart from most of its competitors-is
federal funding of Canada Post's pension plan. According to Price
Waterhouse: "[Canada Post's] employees are part of the Canadian federal
government's pension plan. From [Canada Post's] perspective, any unfunded
liability is an obligation of the federal government."43 In that manner, the
federal government implicitly subsidizes Canada Post's cost of labor, just as it
explicitly subsidizes the firm's cost of capital.
3. The Statutory Monopoly
Under the CPCA, Canada Post "has the sole and exclusive privilege of
collecting, transmitting and delivering letters to the addressee thereof within
Canada."" Not included within Parliament's definition, and therefore not
within the scope of Canada Post's exclusive privilege, are newspapers,
magazines, books, catalogs, and goods.45 The exclusive privilege does not
apply to "letters of an urgent nature that are transmitted by a messenger for a
fee at least equal to an amount that is three times the regular rate of postage
payable for delivery in Canada of similarly addressed letters weighing fifty
grams" or "letters in the course of transmission by any electronic or optical
means.'4 So, the major markets that are open to competition are parcel post,
express mail, and electronic or optical communications. Any person who
contravenes Canada Post's exclusive privilege over letter mail is guilty of a
crime, punishable by imprisonment.47 Canada Post, however, implies that it is
not concerned with enforcing its monopoly. "A recent Canada Post
38. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
39. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 11.
40. Id. at 11, 13.
41. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 14.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 17.
44. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 14 (1985) (Can.).
45. Id.
46. §15.
47. §§ 56, 60.
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publication noted that a taxi company was competing with [Canada Post] in
Calgary and Edmonton for delivery of letters. 48 The taxi company delivers
standard mail for 35¢, significantly lower than Canada Post's rate of 45¢.49
B. Competition
With all its privileges and immunities, Canada Post today finds itself
confronting a daunting reality. The enterprise acknowledged in 1995 that it
"is already experiencing erosion of some Lettermail volumes to electronic
funds transfer, automatic account debiting and electronic messaging such as
facsimile transmission and electronic mail. '50 Discussing the period just
before its conversion to Crown corporation status, Canada Post stated:
"Competition in the form of courier companies, facsimile machines, direct
funds transfer and telecommunications firms sprang up to take away the
premium parts of the postal business." 51 In testimony before the U.S.
Congress in January 1996, Canada Post's president and chief executive
officer Georges Clermont called for an unfettered ability to adapt: "Postal
services are no different than other corporations or organizations, to survive
they have to be relevant.
52
Mr. Clermont's remark cuts to the very reason for Canada Post's
existence. In an era of rapid technological change and competitive
substitution, one can read the remark as an acknowledgement of the
decreasing relevance of Canada Post's traditional business-the collection,
transport, and delivery of letter mail-and the need to reconsider Canada
Post's mandate. Should Canada Post participate in competitive businesses
and expand into emerging ones so long as the government owns the company
or, at the very least, the company retains a statutory monopoly over letter
mail?
1. Traditional Services and Aggressive Expansion
Canada Post provides services that range from traditional letter mail and
parcel post to recent innovations in which Canada Post acts as the link
between businesses with electronic capabilities and those that continue to rely
on paper-based information.
48. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
49. Supra note 19.
50. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 7.
51. Supra note 19.
52. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Post Office and Civil Service of the Senate Comm on
Gov't Affairs and the Subcomm. on the Postal Service of the House Comm on Gov't Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Georges C. Clermont, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Canada Post Corp.) [hereinafter Clermont Testimony].
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Canada Post offers traditional postal services such as the delivery of letter
mail, parcels, express mail, publications, and advertisements. "Letter mail is
defined as letters, postcards or similar communications completely or partially
typewritten or handwritten, receipts, invoices or similar financial statements
relating to a specified sum of money, or any other mail that the sender
chooses to mail at the Lettermail rates of postage., 53 Lettermail in Canada is
subject to delivery standards: two days for local delivery, three for in-province
delivery, and four for out-of-province delivery.
For package delivery throughout Canada, Canada Post offers its Regular
Post as the "lowest priced parcel service in Canada" and has delivery
standards of three days for local shipments, four to five days within a
province, and four to thirteen days for national shipments.5 4 Canada Post
offers overnight service itself and through its subsidiary, Purolator Courier.
Boasting of a network with which "no other courier company can compare,"
Canada Post offers its overnight service under the name Priority Courier.
5
Purolator, one of Canada's largest overnight couriers, handles more than
300,000 envelopes and parcels each night. It operates such branded services
as Weekender, USA.M., and 9AM DayStarter, and offers assurance to its
customers with a scanning and tracking system called Purotrakker.5 6 Canada
Post also offers a medium speed, medium price, expedited service called
Xpresspost.57
In an effort to generate new business, Canada Post has forayed into a
variety of new services, including hybrid mail options, desktop publishing,
and electronic commerce.58 Unrestrained by its broad mandate to provide any
services incidental to postal service and to consider the developing
technologies of communication, Canada Post has aggressively developed new
service products to add value to its traditional distribution services. In fact,
Canada Post sees such vertical integration as essential to its survival. Canada
Post anticipates that, "[w]ith the convergence of computers, electronic
communication and interactive television, [it] will position itself to deploy
electronic network services that will complement and be integrated with its
extensive physical network."
59
53. Canada Post Corp., Consumer Services Within Canada, Dec. 10, 1996 available in
INTERNET (enter "www.mailposte.ca/english/postservice/canada.html#priority courier").
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Purolator Courier Ltd., Corporate Profile, Dec. 10, 1996 available in INTERNET (enter
"www.mailposte.ca/english/electronic/hybrid.html#mail").
57. Canada Post Corp., Consumer Services Within Canada, Dec. 10, 1996 available in
INTERNET (enter "www.mailposte.ca/english/postservice/canada.html#priority courier").
58. Canada Post Corp., Hybrid Mai, Dec. 10, 1996 available in INTERNET (enter
"www.mailposte.ca/english/electronic/hybrid.html#mairl).
59. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 7.
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Through its OmniPost service, Canada Post offers point-to-point
communication via e-mail, faxmail, or lasermail. 60 With faxmail, Canada Post
receives the customer's electronically transmitted message and transmits it to
the designated recipient's fax machine. With Lasermail, Canada Post receives
the customer's document in electronic form, transmits it to its own outlet
closest to the recipient's location, and delivers a hardcopy of the document
overnight.
Canada Post has developed several services to accommodate point-to-
multipoint communications as well. To accommodate direct marketers,
Canada Post has created two services that take advantage of the company's
extensive distribution system and its databases on the Canadian population.
Canada Post's GeoPost Target Marketing service offers informational
assistance to direct marketers. 6' Canada Post presumably is selling and
analyzing the demographic information that it has accumulated from years of
serving the public. In FY 1994-95 Canada Post launched its ProMedia service
that takes a customer's camera-ready artwork, "determines the optimum
target market, arranges the printing, prepares and handles the mailing."
62
Canada Post apparently subcontracts the printing service.
In addition, Canada Post offers Electronic Lettermail and Electronic
Admail, two related, new product lines that offer an alternative means of
producing and delivering invoices, statements, time-sensitive notes
(Electronic Lettermail), and direct marketing advertising mail, solicitations,
notices, and bulletins (Electronic Admail). 63 From information supplied by
customers in electronic form (such as mailing lists, transactional data, and
messages), Canada Post produces the customer's mailing pieces (with
customer approval of proofs) and transmits the material electronically to its
regional production centers, where the material is printed, inserted into
envelopes, sorted, and delivered. 64 The system is designed to save the
subscriber time and effort by bypassing normal sorting and handling,
speeding up production and reducing bottlenecks, and freeing up the
customer's labor force.
Canada Post also offers Remote Desktop Publishing, which is similar to
Lettermail Plus and Admail Plus in that the service takes the customer's
documents in electronic form and prints, stuffs into envelopes, and delivers
newsletters for businesses and organizations that mail frequently to large
customer mailing lists.
65
Finally, Canada Post has begun to enter businesses entirely unrelated to
the traditional collection, transportation, and delivery of letters and goods. For
60. Hybrid Mail, supra note 58.
61. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.
62. Id.
63. Hybrid Mail, supra note 58.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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example, Canada Post is part of a consortium, known as UBI, that is
conducting an interactive television pilot project that allows customers in
34,000 homes to purchase goods, pay bills, and receive e-mail from home.66
In conjunction with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Canada Post
intends to offer automatic teller machines in certain corporate retail outlets.
67
2. Limiting Mailbox Access
Canada Post does not have a statutory monopoly over access to the
customer's mailbox as the Postal Service does in the United States.68 Pursuant
to its mandate to ensure the integrity and security of the mail stream,
however, Canada Post controls access to all locked mailboxes and mailboxes
in most apartment buildings. 69 This privilege is of growing concern to
existing and potential participants in competitive mail service markets
because Canada Post has embarked on a major campaign to install cluster
mailboxes in communities throughout the country. 70 According to Canada
Post, community mail boxes and kiosks now serve approximately 1.4 million
addresses. 7' Canada Post readily acknowledges that the increased use of the
community mailboxes is designed to help reduce the allegedly rising costs of
home delivery. What Canada Post fails to acknowledge is that the increased
use of community mailboxes establishes a de facto monopoly over access to
an increasing number of customers' mailboxes.
The existence of a monopoly over access to a customer's mailbox-
whether it is de jure, as in the United States,72 or de facto, as is emerging in
Canada-has three significant economic consequences. First, it enables
Canada Post to raise the cost of its rivals' deliveries. Second, it deters vertical
integration into mail delivery by businesses (such as newspapers and utilities)
with large numbers of routine mailings to virtually every postal customer on a
given route. Third, it raises the cost to the customer of substituting alternative
delivery services for those of Canada Post.
Those implications of control over access were at the heart of a recent
legal challenge brought by some of Canada Post's competitors. In June 1995,
the Federal Court of Canada held that "there is no question Canada Post acted
within its parliamentary mandate when delivering flyers to apartment building
66. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
67. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 16.
68. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Post Office and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. On
Gov't Affairs and the Subcomm. on the Postal Service of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Michael E. Motley, Associate Director, Government
Business Operations Issues, General Gov't Div., U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Motley
Testimony].
69. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
70. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 2.
71. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1994).
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mailboxes. . . .7' The court thus dismissed an application, filed a month
earlier by several companies competing with Canada Post in the market for
delivery of unaddressed advertising mail, that sought an order to prohibit
Canada Post from using its control over access to locked apartment mailboxes
to deliver unaddressed admail. The applicants-Canadian Daily Newspaper
Association (CDNA),74 Metroland Printing, Publishing & Distribution Ltd.,
Netmar Inc., and Les Messageries Publi-Maison Ltee.-complained that
Canada Post was "[u]nlawfully exploiting its control over access to locked
apartment mail boxes in order to give its unaddressed Admail service an
undue competitive advantage over private sector competitors in the
distribution of unaddressed advertising materials to consumers., 75 According
to CDNA's president:
Canada Post's practices with regard to apartment access deprive the
members of the CDNA and the other applicants of the ability to
compete with Canada Post on equal terms for the distribution
business of advertisers, many of whom insist that their unaddressed
flyers reach apartment dwellers on a guaranteed and comprehensive
basis .... This unwarranted extension of Canada Post's monopoly
costs the members of the CDNA and the other applicants substantial
revenue in terms of both lost and potential business . . . . [IUt is
imperative that competition take place on equal terms. Canada Post
should not be permitted to leverage its statutory powers in order to
achieve an unfair advantage over its private sector competitors. That
is not consistent with the wording or intention of the Canada Post
Corporation Act.
76
Canada Post's senior vice president of operations countered: "Access to these
boxes is granted to the corporation by the landlord of the building. We deliver
mail to these boxes because they are secure, but if access is granted to other
delivery companies, the security of the mail would be compromised. '77
73. Federal Court of Canada Finds Canada Post Acting Within Parliamentary Mandate When
Delivering Flyers, CAN. NEwsWiRE, June 23. 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter
Canada Post Acting Within Parliamentary Mandate].
74. The CDNA is a member service organization serving 84 of the 107 daily newspapers in
Canada. CDNA members account for approximately 86% of newspapers distributed daily across Canada.
CDNA members distribute unaddressed flyers either as inserts in their newspapers to newspaper
subscribers or to non-subscribers as standalone items through various forms of extended market coverage
vehicles. The other applicants carry on various businesses including the delivery of unaddressed
advertising flyers, either as inserts in controlled-distribution community newspapers or on a stand-alone
basis. Canadian Daily Newspaper Association-CDNA Takes Canada Post to Court, CAN. NEwsWIRE,
May 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library [hereinafter CDNA Takes Canada Post to Court].
75. Canada Post Acting Within Parliamentary Mandate, supra note 73.
76. CDNA Takes Canada Post to Court, supra note 74 (remarks of John E. Foy).
77. Canada Post Acting Within Parliamentary Mandate, supra note 73 (remarks of Leo
Blanchette).
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In his opinion, Mr. Justice Cullen stated:
My finding that unaddressed Admail constitutes "mail," combined
with the fact that there is no express statutory prohibition against
delivery of Admail, leads me to the conclusion that Canada Post has
not exceeded its jurisdiction ... Putting flyers into mailboxes, even
if they are not letters per se, is an undertaking which is clearly
incidental to Canada Post's mandate and not an act in excess of its
jurisdiction.78
He concluded that "[tihe applicants' argument is flawed because it makes
illogical connections between access to mailboxes and the delivery of
flyers. '79 Mr. Justice Cullen said: "I have no doubt apartment dwellers would
not feel comfortable with many people having access to mailboxes, especially
given the number of cheques and credit cards which are sent by the post. It is
clear to me that Canada Post takes its duty to provide security of the mail
seriously ...I do not find that Canada Post has used its custody over
apartment mailbox keys or its monopoly over the delivery of letters for an
improper purpose." 80
The court clearly accepted Canada Post's argument that access to the
apartment building mailboxes has great security implications, presumably
because access to a single mailbox in an apartment building often can be
obtained only along with access to all the building's mailboxes. 81 It may be
true that there is a greater risk associated with more open access to such
mailboxes when compared with access to a home's mail slot. But, it is
difficult to see any greater threat to security associated with more open access
to such mailboxes than already exists with respect to the present access to
mailboxes outside a customer's premises, Without assessing any further
considerations of policy, the Federal Court decided the issue strictly by
comparing Canada Post's mandate and its questioned activities. A Canada
Post news release stated that the Federal Court found the delivery of admail to
be entirely consistent with, and in fact an advancement of, "the generally
beneficial result of expanding postal services to meet the needs of Canadian
businesses and advertisers, of becoming financially self-sustaining, and of




81. The same, of course, holds true for Canada Post's community mailboxes. A challenge to
Canada Post's domain over those mailboxes, however, would meet with even greater resistance from the
court because they are the property of Canada Post.
82. Court Favors Canada Post over Torstar on Junk Mail, CAN. FIN. REP., June 23, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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appears to fall within the broad scope of Canada Post's mandate, as discussed
earlier.
In its report, the Canada Post Mandate Review disagrees with the
conclusion that the delivery of unaddressed admail is within the scope of
Canada Post's core postal service mandate. Consequently, the Review
recommends that Canada Post withdraw from the unaddressed admail
delivery business. The Review reasons that Canada Post's aggressive
competition in the unaddressed admail market is a "clear instance where a
distortion is created by applying to competitive commercial purposes the
unrivalled market power and privilege that Canada Post derives from its
public sector monopoly position." 83 Thus, the Review finds that the
corporation's "exclusive access to apartment mailboxes for the delivery of
unaddressed admail constitutes an unfair competitive advantage for Canada
Post over the private sector." 84 As for the decision in the CDNA case, the
Review notes that Mr. Justice Cullen's dismissal of the case was based "on
the legal grounds that the corporation has not exceeded its parliamentary
mandate by delivering admail to apartments, nor has it engaged in legally
improper activity." 85 But the Review concludes that the real issue in the case
was not one of legality; rather, it was an issue of fairness.
As Canada Post builds more and more community mailboxes-
sometimes over the objections of the very communities that such boxes are
intended to serve 86 -it increasingly forecloses competition in postal services,
such as the delivery of unaddressed admail. The costs incurred to consumer
welfare call for a revised approach. Because there are significant costs
associated with Canada Post's increasingly pervasive de facto monopoly over
mailbox access, Parliament may wish to reconsider the impact of its policy.
Parliament need not open community mailboxes and apartment building
mailboxes to the general public. Parliament could implement a licensing
scheme whereby a bonded provider of mail services would be required to
obtain a license for access to the community or apartment mailboxes. These
licenses could limit access to particular times of day. Parliament could make
the licenses marketable to other bonded entities.
3. Labor
Labor costs are the largest component of Canada Post's total operating
costs. 87 One estimate puts total labor costs, "including wages and benefits,
employment levels and job security, and negotiated work practices," at
83. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 29.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. DOUGLAS K. ADIE, THE MAIL MONOPOLY: ANALYSING CANADIAN POSTAL SERVICE 10
(1990).
87. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 23.
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approximately 75% of Canada Post's operating costs. 88 Canada Post holds the
distinction of according its letter carriers "the absolute right to travel to and
from their base on the corporation's time for their lunch break, even in some
instances by paid taxi." 89 In his evaluation of Canada Post's financial position
for the Review, Gordon Ritchie, a former federal Deputy Minister and Deputy
Chief Negotiator of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, concludes that:
The Canadian Union of Postal Workers has been remarkably
successful over the past 30 years in arrogating to its members the
lion's share of economic rents from the Canada Post monopoly ....
The existing Canada Post Corporation collective agreements
constitute what is arguably the most uncompetitive and inefficient
labour agreement currently in place in any jurisdiction in North
America .... It should be noted that excessive wages are not the
main problem. Pay for time not worked is an even more substantial
direct cost burden. The most costly provisions over the long run are
probably those restricting the Canada Post Corporation's ability to
terminate, to redeploy or to employ more efficiently its huge
workforce. 90
The existence of the Canadian postal service, both as the Post Office
Department and as Canada Post, has been marked by a history of strained
labor relations. In the twenty-six-year period from 1965 to 1991, Canadian
postal workers went on strike twelve times. 91 During a prolonged strike in
1991, relations between management and the union were said to have
deteriorated "to the point of contempt, if not palpable hatred. 92 Since its
1981 transformation from a government department to a Crown corporation,
Canada Post has tried to be more like a private business; as a result, it has
attempted to cut costs, including labor costs. A concomitant consolidation in
labor representation-four bargaining units now represent over 90% of
Canada Post's employees 93 -has provided the postal worker unions with
added leverage to resist Canada Post's attempts to change.94
The consolidated representation has succeed in securing certain benefits
for postal workers at the expense of Canada Post and Canadian consumers.
The most significant benefit is that all unionized employees have job security:
88. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 97.
89. Id. at 96.
90. Id. at 97.
91. Brian Bergman, Trouble in the Mail: Canada Post's Problems Are Deep-Seated,
MAcLEAN'S, Sept. 2, 1991, at 19.
' 92. Canada: Management and Unions Far Apart on Key Issues of Job Security, REUTER
TEXTLINE FIN. POST, Aug. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
93. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 3.
94. Bergman, supra note 91, at 19.
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they cannot be laid off.95 The Review observes that "[tihere is no readily
apparent reason . . .why Canada Post workers should enjoy virtually
unconditional job security when it is not available to other Canadians in the
public or private sectors." 96 The power of the postal worker unions to extract
such a concession casts serious doubt over whether Canada Post can ever be
the lowest-cost provider of competitive postal services. Canada Post's chief
executive officer acknowledges that guaranteed employment, as it results in
part from the statutory monopoly, restrains the firm's ability to adapt and
contributes to complacency in its work force: "[The employees] know that
they have contractually obtained job security and that the Post office is not
about to disappear. A normal corporation has a choice of shutting down an
operation: we don't have that choice and it is evident in our workforce's
behaviour." 97 In FY 1994-95, Canada Post's level of absenteeism averaged
9.9 days per employee, representing a cost to Canada Post of approximately
$55 million.98
For Canada Post, labor costs continue to rise, even though purportedly
there no longer exists a premium built into its wage schedule. From FY 1993-
94 to FY 1994-95, Canada Post reduced its total workforce by 302
employees, but concurrently increased the number of full-time employees by
more than that number. The result was a net increase in labor expenditures
(measured in millions of hours paid) of 5%.99 According to Price Waterhouse,
"[w]age premiums had become inherent in the post office wage structure for
three reasons: (1) monopoly, (2) essential service, and (3) government
management."' 1°° Canada Post, however, claims that a premium in basic wage
rates no longer exists and that wage rates are comparable to industry norms. 10 1
The corporation has indicated that some non-wage premiums remain,
regarding working conditions and rules that deal with overtime and part-time
and casual labor.10 2 Canada Post also has been trying to redistribute work
hours from night to day and from weekends to weekdays, particularly during
the summer.
10 3
Finally, two other details about Canada Post's workforce point to its
unique status as a public enterprise and demonstrate how it attempts to
modify its cost structure when expanding in competitive businesses, given its
labor relations. As noted earlier, Canada Post's employees are part of the
federal government's pension plan; therefore, the pension is not Canada
95. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 16.
96. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 96.
97. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
98. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 10.
99. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 36.
100. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 17.
101. In 1995, on average, letter carriers earned $16.07 per hour, motorized mail drivers earned
$16.51 per hour, and mail handlers earned $16.50 per hour. Id.
102. Id.
103. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 10.
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Post's liability. 1°4 Canada Post has hired a separate work force, earning much
lower wages than regular letter carriers, to deliver unaddressed admail,
usually on weekends.
10 5
Labor relations have been one of the most troublesome hindrances in
Canada Post's attempt to shed its inherited inefficiencies and compete in a
dynamic industry. The Review notes the importance of the labor issues by
stating that "no strategic repositioning of the corporation can fail to address
these [labor] issues."'1 6 It thus recommends that "a more realistic set of
arrangements be negotiated through a process of bargaining in good faith,
illuminated by an understanding of the new realities of the Canadian
workplace."' 10
7
4. Pricing and Costing: Policy and Disclosure
Under Canadian laws of general application and Canada Post's explicit
statutory mandate, Canada Post is prohibited from abusing its statutory
monopoly to benefit its competitive businesses. Canada Post, however, sets its
own rates and, in the view of its competitors, exploits the lack of a disclosure
requirement in the ratemaking process to the detriment of efficient rivals.
The Competition Act prohibits a "broad range of anticompetitive
conduct, including predatory pricing and abuses by corporations of dominant
positions they may have in any class or species of business in any area of
Canada.' 0°8 Under the CPCA, Canada Post must set rates that are "fair and
reasonable and consistent so far as possible with providing a revenue,
together with any revenue from other sources, sufficient to defray the costs
incurred by the Corporation in the conduct of its operations under this
Act.' 1 9 Parliament has not established a third-party regulatory body 'to
govern the rates implemented by Canada Post, even though the enterprise
enjoys a statutory monopoly. Canada Post is authorized to devise its own
regulations prescribing its postal rates, with the approval of the Governor in
Council." 0 To receive such approval, Canada Post must first publish its rate
change proposals in the Canada Gazette for sixty days. All interested parties
may then make presentations to the Minister responsible for Canada Post.
Final proposed regulations are submitted to the Governor in Council for
approval. As Canada Post explains, the "formal external rate regulation
approval process is now limited, in large part, to letter mail products which
fall within the ambit of Canada Post's exclusive privilege and which do not
104. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 17.
105. Id. at 15.
106. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 97.
107. id. at 99.
108. COMPETITION AND REGULATION, supra note 26, at 11.
109. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 19 (1985) (Can.).
110. CoMPETION AND REGULATION, supra note 26, at 16.
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involve incentives for volume tenderings and mail preparation." '111 All other
rates are set by either generic or specific contracts.1 12 In addition, Canada Post
can offer bulk discounts and "experimental services for three years without
seeking government approval of rates."
13
Canada Post's ratemaking process lacks the transparency usually
associated, at least in its aspirational form, with the traditional public utility
commission that has jurisdiction over a regulated monopolist. 114 As Price
Waterhouse notes, "[s]ince the rate setting process is not public, interested
parties do not have access to the costing studies and other information
underlying the rates." 115 The Review observes: "Despite the understandable
concerns that a corporation in its unique position might be using revenues
from its monopoly to cross-subsidize unfairly low-prices for its competitive
activities, Canada Post invokes 'commercial sensitivity' in refusing to
publicly release detailed cost profit information for its various products and
services."'1 6 This lack of disclosure prompts competitors to claim that Canada
Post cross-subsidizes its competitive businesses with revenues from its
statutorily protected businesses. In a report prepared for the Review, Canada
Post assures that it "has consistently interpreted this mandate to mean that the
prices of its exclusive privilege services must be such as to ensure that
revenues generated from those services are not utilized to cross-subsidize the
provision by Canada Post of concessionary or competitive services."
117
Canada Post further declares that "the rates of its competitive products or
services exceed the average incremental costs" and that the firm complies
with the requirement to set its prices for competitive and commercial products
"on a basis which will maximize their contribution in a competitive
environment." 1 8 Finally, Canada Post explicitly states that its competitive
and commercial products "are not cross-subsidized, in any way, by revenues
generated by Canada Post through the provision of exclusive privilege
services." 119
The Review, on the other hand, finds that "Canada Post... does not have
accounting systems that identify the actual costs and revenues of each
specific product and service with satisfactory precision .... 120 The Review
notes that Canada Post uses a method that "consists of allocating variable and
111. Id. at 17.
112. Robert Albon, Postal Rate-Making Procedures and Outcomes in Various Countries, in
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN POSTAL SERVICES 233, 236 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer
eds., 1991).
113. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
114. Traditional public utility commissions include such agencies as the Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and state public utility commissions.
115. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
116. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 21.
117. COMPETITION AND REGULATION, supra note 26, at 17.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 21.
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specific fixed costs to each product line, but leaving common fixed costs
unallocated because the corporation says they would remain unchanged if any
one product or product group were removed.' 21 Canada Post fails to allocate
approximately 40% of its total costs.' 22 In examining Canada Post's non-
allocated cost categories, the Review finds that the corporation's Activity
Based Costing accounting system (ABC) accords Canada Post "considerable
latitude to exercise discretion in deciding what should or should not be
included in the definition of incremental costs."'123 Moreover, the Review
opines that Canada Post's utilization of the ABC system, the purpose of
which is to distinguish between common network and incremental costs of
providing a product, is colored by Canada Post's incentive to understate its
incremental costs and overstate its common or non-allocated costs. The
Review observes that misallocations occurred as a result of Canada Post's
incentive-motivated accounting. For example, Canada Post's treatment of the
concept of time in determining long-run incremental costs is one of the
discretionary methodologies that led to cost misallocations. 124 Other instances
of misallocation stemmed from "how causal links between products and
activities were identified or ignored" by the corporation's accounting.
25
Ultimately, the Review finds that "[t]o the extent that cost misallocation is a
form of cross-subsidization, .. . Canada Post has cross-subsidized."'
126
5. The Purolator Acquisition
In 1993, Canada Post purchased 75% of Purolator Courier Ltd. from
Onex Corporation for $55 million. 27 The Canadian Courier Association and
some of its members objected to the acquisition, arguing that the acquisition
would enable Canada Post to abuse its resulting dominance in the market and
to cross-subsidize its courier business. At the time of the acquisition,
Purolator was estimated to control 43% of Canada's courier market, while
Canada Post controlled less than 10%.128 Thus, Canada Post's expanded
courier operations would account for approximately a 50% share of a market
approaching $2 billion. 129 Canada Post's chief executive officer dismissed
allegations that the enterprise would cross-subsidize its private courier
business with its letter mail monopoly: "The concern is without any
foundation since Purolator Courier Ltd. will remain a separate commercial
tax-paying enterprise with its own management, employees, operations and
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 44.
124. Id. at 44-45.
125. Id. at 45.
126. Id.
127. Robert Gibbens, Canada Post Buys Courier Stake, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 1993, at 17.
128. Richard Siklos, Canada Post in Talks to Buy Purolator, FIN. POST, June 1, 1993, at 1.
129. Id.
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service products."' 30 Under the terms of the final agreement, Purolator was to
remain a separate entity only until December 31, 1996.
Two government agencies dismissed the allegations brought by
opponents to the acquisition. They held that the combined operations of the
two companies would not significantly lessen competition in the Canadian
courier market. In arriving at its conclusion, the National Transportation
Agency accepted 31% as the accurate estimate of combined market share.
13 1
The Bureau of Competition Policy further held that there existed insufficient
evidence to prove that Canada Post would cross-subsidize its courier
operations with monopoly profits. 132 The Bureau accepted 40% as its estimate
of combined market share-not enough in its view to enable Canada Post to
sustain cross-subsidization and predatory pricing.' 
33
In defense of its expansion in the competitive courier market, Canada
Post cited its need to stay competitive with large private American couriers,
such as Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and DHL International. Mr.
Clermont said that "the market is not so much east and west as north and
south.'
34
6. The Bureau of Competition Policy's Analysis
Opponents of Canada Post's acquisition of Purolator expressed concern
over two issues. They claimed that it was inappropriate for a Crown
corporation participating in a competitive market to acquire a competing
company to strengthen its own market position, and they asserted that the
acquisition would give Canada Post the ability to cross-subsidize its courier
operations with the returns from its statutory monopoly.135 Federal Express
Canada, for example, called for the creation of a regulatory mechanism to
prohibit cross-subsidization and exploitation of unfair competitive
advantage. 13
6
In its review of the merger under the Competition Act, the Bureau of
Competition Policy concluded that it did not have a basis upon which to
challenge the transaction. The Acting Director of Investigation and Research,
George Addy, determined that the issue "[w]hether Crown corporations
130. Richard Siklos, Post Office to Keep Purolator Separate, FIN. POST, June 5, 1993, at 3.
131. Janet McFarland, Couriers Fight on as Purolator Sale Ok'd, FIN. POST, Sept. 30, 1993, at
3.
132. Canada Competition Bureau Approves Purolator Sale, REUTERS FIN SERV., Nov. 26, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
133. COMPETITION AND REGULATION, supra note 26, at 24 n.6.
134. Richard Siklos, supra note 130, at 3.
135. BUREAU OF COMPETITION POLICY, BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORP./PUROLATOR
COURIER INC. 1 (Nov. 26, 1993) [hereinafter BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORP./PUROLATOR
COURIER].
136. Federal Express-Competition Bureau Decision Inadequate, CAN. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 29,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
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should compete with firms in the private sector [was] not within the purview
of the Act, the purpose of which is to maintain and encourage competition in
Canada."' 37 Thus the Bureau of Competition Policy properly limited the
scope of its investigation to the reach of its existing jurisdiction under the
Competition Act and did not assess broader questions of government policy.
Expert testimony supported opposing conclusions on the narrowly drawn
issue of actual and potential cross-subsidization and predatory pricing.
Professor Leonard Waverman of the University of Toronto argued that "the
entire body of economic literature and specific material presented to the
Bureau states that a monopolist like Canada Post has the incentive to cross-
subsidize its competitive activities."' 38 Another University of Toronto
economist, Professor Frank Mathewson, supported the position that "the
available empirical evidence establishes that Canada Post has not engaged in
improper cross-subsidization or predatory pricing activities." According to
Mathewson, "the pricing mandate of Canada Post is not one of predation and
does not involve or rely upon cross-subsidization of competitive products
using revenues generated from Canada Post's exclusive privilege products or
services."
'1 39
Only two cases in Canada have addressed the issue of predatory pricing
under the Competition Act.14° As a result, the methodology outlined in the
Bureau of Competition Policy's Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines
provides the authority for determining the existence of alleged predatory
pricing as prohibited by the Competition Act.141 The Guidelines present a
two-pronged analysis. The first part considers whether the alleged wrongdoer
has the market power sufficient to lessen competition or eliminate
competitors. 142 Market share is considered a proxy for market power. It is
presumed that a market share of less than 35% is unlikely to enable a
company to price in a predatory manner and then recoup incurred losses by
later charging supracompetitive prices in the absence of competitors.143 The
second part of the Bureau's test scrutinizes the prices of the alleged predator
to determine whether they are "unreasonably low."' 144 Price-cost margins are
used to assess the reasonableness of prices. Prices at or above average total
cost are not considered unreasonably low, regardless of market power
possessed by the alleged predator. Prices below the average variable cost are
usually considered unreasonably low. Prices set between average total cost
137. BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORP./PUROLATOR, supra note 135, at 1.
138. Competition Bureau Decision Inadequate, supra note 136.
139. COMPETITION AND REGULATION, supra note 26, at 24-25.
140. Id. at 22.
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and average variable cost are not considered predatory in the absence of direct
or indirect evidence of predatory intent. 1
45
Director Addy's examination focused on market share and concentration,
barriers to entry, the effectiveness of remaining competition, and issues
surrounding cross-subsidization. 146 The Director judged the strength of the
remaining competitors, as well as the nature and extent of both entry and
expansion, as guards against potential cross-subsidization and predatory
pricing. 147 He found that the combined revenues of Priority Courier and
Purolator represented approximately 40% of revenues generated in the
Canadian small parcel express market, and that the four largest firms in that
market would receive approximately 70% of all revenues.1 48 Although the
Director acknowledged that the cost of entering the small parcel express
market on a national basis involves significant costs, he found that regulatory
impediments to entry are moderate and that there are enough potential
entrants that would enter the market in response to supracompetitive
pricing.149 Furthermore, demand in the relevant market was particularly pdice
sensitive, and competition was robust. 50 The Director was convinced that its
acquisition of Purolator would not give Canada Post the ability to sustain a
significant and nontransitory price increase.'
51
C. Limited Regulatory Oversight
Canada Post is a largely autonomous and unregulated organization,
particularly in light of the fact that it has a statutory monopoly over the
delivery of letter mail. The government appoints the board of directors, the
chairman of the board, and the president. 152 The board is responsible for
managing Canada Post.153 Subject to the approval of the Governor in Council,
the board may prescribe its own regulations for operating the corporation.
Among other terms, those regulations define what constitutes a "letter" and,
thus, what material falls within the scope of Canada Post's statutory
monopoly.' 54 As discussed earlier, Canada Post sets its own rates, almost
entirely without government oversight. 5 5 Canada Post must comply with
directives issued by the Minister responsible for the corporation.' 56 However,
145. Id.
146. BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORP./PUROLATOR COURIER, supra note 135, at 3.
147. BUREAU OF COMPETITION POLICY, NEWS RELEASE: DIRECTOR WILL NOT OPPOSE CANADA
POST ACQuISmON OF PUROLATOR (1993) [hereinafter BUREAU NEWS RELEASE].
148. BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORP./PUROLATOR, supra note 135, at 4.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 6.
151. BUREAU NEWS RELEASE, supra note 147.
152. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C- 10, §§ 6-8 (1985) (Can.).
153. § 10.
154. § 19.
155. Id,; PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
156. Id. at 13; Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 22 (1985) (Can.).
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in practice, the Minister issues statements to the public regarding what
changes in policy Canada Post ought to implement more often than he issues
actual directives.'
57
Canada Post's board has significant autonomy in making its investment
decisions and setting its own course.' 58 Although Canada Post may not invest
in publicly traded companies, the corporation was able to structure its
acquisition of Purolator to conform to relevant legal constraints.'
5 9
D. Summary
As a Crown corporation, Canada Post enjoys Parlimentary-bestowed
privileges and immunities, such as a monopoly over lettermail. It also holds
many direct and indirect subsidies, such as federal funding of its pension plan
and favorable borrowing terms enjoyed by government entities in private
capital markets. Nonetheless, the corporation finds itself confronting the
daunting reality of eroding lettermail volumes due to the growth of such
substitutes as courier delivery, electronic mail, and electronic funds transfers.
In response, Canada Post is aggressively expanding into new markets where it
competes with private firms.
Canada Post forayed into a dominant position within the courier service
market with its purchase of Purolator. Currently, the corporation controls
approximately 50% of that market. It also has become a significant player in
the unaddressed admail delivery market by taking advantage of its de facto
monopoly over access to locked mailboxes and mailboxes in apartment
buildings. Canada Post's expansion has not been limited to the courier and
admail markets. The corporation has positioned itself as a competitor in a
variety of new communication markets, including e-mail, faxmail, desktop
publishing, and electronic commerce.
In light of all the privileges and immunities that Canada Post enjoys,
especially its statutory monopoly over lettermail, its expansion into new
markets in competition with private firms raises a number of concerns. One
key concern involves Canada Post's ability to exploit its monopoly power in
lettermail to the detriment of its rivals in competitive markets. The
exploitation may take the form of Canada Post cross-subsidizing the
provision of its competitive services with revenue from its statutorily
protected businesses. The concern with such cross-subsidization is heightened
when one considers that Canada Post's ratemaking process lacks
transparency, and no third-party regulatory agency is charged with overseeing
the rates implemented by the corporation. Cross-subsidization becomes an
even greater concern in light of the concessions accorded to Canada Post's
157. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REvIEW, supra note 14, at 14.
158. Id. at 18.
159. Id.
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employees. For example, its employees cannot be laid off. Such concessions
seriously undermine Canada Post's ability to become a low-cost provider of
postal services in competition with private firms, but for its ability to cross-
subsidize.
H. Technological Justifications for the Postal Monopoly
There are two main technological justifications offered for the protection
and extension of a government postal monopoly: (1) the presence of a natural
monopoly production technology and (2) the existence of economies of scope.
These arguments are used to imply that the monopoly over first class mail
should be protected by statute and that Canada Post should expand into other
markets to achieve cost efficiencies. But why should one presume the
presence of a natural monopoly? The burden of proof should be on those
asserting the existence of natural monopoly to show that it in fact exists. For
if a natural monopoly can be shown for letter mail, it follows logically that the
entire market for postal services would be best served by a single firm-an
improbable proposition. 16° Placing the burden of proof on the monopolists is
especially appropriate if proponents of natural monopoly seek to preserve a
statutory monopoly as well.
This Part of the Article shows that the natural monopoly justification for
Canada Post's monopoly over letter mail has no basis in current technological
and market developments in communications, transportation, and delivery
services in Canada. There is, consequently, no reason to conclude that postal
delivery is a natural monopoly or to continue or to extend the statutory mo-
nopoly on postal services. For similar reasons, the rationale based on
economies of scope is also unpersuasive.
A. The Natural Monopoly Justification for the Public Postal Monopoly
The natural monopoly argument for public provision of postal services
under a statutory monopoly has two components. First, the argument asserts
that the provision of postal services is a natural monopoly. Second, the
argument asserts that the cost savings from having a single provider of those
160. For proponents of the natural monopoly theory see Bruce M. Owen & Robert D. Willig,
Economics and Postal Pricing, in THE FUTURE OF THE POSTAL SERVICE 227, 236 (Joel L. Fleishman ed.,
1983); John C. Panzar, Competition, Efficiency, and the Vertical Structure of Postal Services, in
REGULATION AND THE NATURE OF POSTAL DELIVERY SERVICES at 91, 94 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R.
Kleindorfer eds., 1992); John C. Panzar, The Economics of Mail Delivery, in GOVERNING THE POSTAL
SERVICE 1, 1-3 (J. Gregory Sidak ed., 1994); John C. Panzar, Is the Postal Service a Natural
Monopoly?, in COMPETITION AND INNOVATION IN POSTAL SERVICES, supra note 112, at 219, 222-24;
Cathy M. Rogerson & William M. Takis, Economies of Scale and Scope and Competition in Postal
Services, in REGULATION AND THE NATURE OF POSTAL DELIVERY SERVICES, supra at 109, 113-15. See
also MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R. KLENDoRFER, THm ECONOMICS OF POSTAL SERVICE 17-18 (1992).
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services can only be achieved by regulatory exclusion of private competitors.
Both assertions are incorrect.
Given existing technology and market alternatives, Canada Post is far
from being a natural monopoly. Technological arguments cannot justify
barring entry into the market because competitive, privately-owned
companies can realize the benefits of any increasing returns to scale that
might inhere in the provision of postal services.
B. The Definition of Natural Monopoly
A production technology is said to exhibit the property of natural
monopoly if a single firm can supply the market at lower cost than two or
more firms can.1 61 This textbook definition of natural monopoly is based on a
cost function that assigns total costs to outputs. The cost function has the
natural monopoly property if a firm with that cost function has lower costs
than would an allocation of output among two or more firms using the same
cost function. If the technology of mail delivery exhibits natural monopoly
characteristics, then a single firm can construct and operate that network at a
lower cost than can two or more firms. Under those circumstances, the single
firm is said to have subadditive costs.
The notion of natural monopoly is used to justify public ownership and
control of Canada Post and its statutory monopoly over letter mail. According
to that argument, regulation of entry is necessary to achieve static efficiency
by establishing the least-cost industry structure-namely, a single firm.
One would expect under quite general conditions that competitive
industries achieve the requisite cost efficiencies from consolidation of
production, whether through expansion, mergers, or procurement contracts. It
bears emphasis, however, that even if Canada Post were to have subadditive
costs, its exclusive privilege over letter mail would not be necessary unless
one could show that Canada Post is an unsustainable natural monopoly. The
sustainability issue need not detain us. Even if there were cost efficiencies
from natural monopoly, one would have to show that achieving those gains
through a protected monopoly yielded benefits exceeding those from greater
innovation, product variety, and lower administrative costs in a competitive
market.
A number of elements of the definition of natural monopoly deserve
emphasis because understanding all of their implications is necessary in order
161. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL Er AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE 8 (1982); SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 22 (1988); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION 295-96 (2d ed. 1994); ROGER SHERMAN, THE REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 80-81
(1989); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 3 (1989); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 19-20 (1988); KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 6-8 (1991).
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to correctly apply the definition to mail delivery. The definition of natural
monopoly begins with a known technology, as represented by the natural
monopoly cost function. To assert that an industry is characterized by natural
monopoly, one implicitly assumes that there is a single "best" technology that
is commonly known, that all firms would have access to that technology, and
that all firms operating the technology would be at the efficient production-
possibility frontier. 162 In particular, the natural monopoly cost function is a
long-run cost function, so that investment can be adjusted to achieve the
efficient level of capital investment required for operating at minimum cost
for each output level. In evaluating the applicability of the natural monopoly
argument, we shall consider the extent to which those aspects of the definition
of natural monopoly are indeed appropriate to Canada Post's system of
collection, sortation, transportation, and distribution.
On the basis of the standard definition, a cost function for a given
production technology has the natural monopoly property if the technology
exhibits economies of scale over the relevant range of output. In particular,
economies of scale are said to be present if the marginal cost of production is
less than the average cost of production over the relevant range of output.'
63
Stated differently, economies of scale are said to exist over the relevant range
of output when unit costs decline with the volume of production. Economies
of scale are a sufficient condition for natural monopoly for a single-product
firm.
Economies of scale can be due to many different technological factors.
Fixed costs are a source of economies of scale, particularly in industries that
require physical networks, such as telecommunications, railroads, oil and
natural gas pipelines, electricity, and water services. Fixed costs are costs that
do not vary with fluctuations in output, unlike operating or "variable" costs.
The fixed costs of establishing a network system are the costs of facilities
such as transmission lines, which are not sensitive to the level of transmission
on the lines.
The need to avoid duplication of facilities, particularly duplication of the
fixed costs of the network system, is an important component of the natural
monopoly argument for regulation of mail delivery. The argument is that,
because costs are minimized by not duplicating network infrastructure,
regulators should bar the entry of competing carriers. That argument has been
put forward in a wide range of regulated industries in which transmission or
transportation facilities are a significant portion of total costs. The duplication
argument, however, is inapplicable to mail delivery.
162. SPULBER, supra note 161, at 138.
163. Id. at 115-18; CARLTON& PERLOFF, supra note 161, at 58-63.
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C. Is Canada Post a Natural Monopoly?
Canada Post is a wholesale and retail provider of delivery services. Those
services involve three main components: (1) contracting for long-distance
transportation, (2) regional sortation and transportation, and (3) local pick-up,
sortation, and delivery. There is no reason to presume that the technologies
for these components, whether taken singly or together, exhibit the properties
of a natural monopoly.
1. Contracting for Long-Distance Transportation
Contracting for long-distance transportation is not a natural monopoly.
Canada Post relies entirely on competitive providers of tiansportation,
including airlines, trucks, ships, and railroads for long-distance transporta-
tion; it performs none of its own long-distance transportation.' 64 Canada Post
also relies on those long-distance transportation companies with which it
contracts to perform much of the information services associated with the
transportation, such as tracking and trend analyses. In June 1995, Canada
Post announced an agreement with Canadian National (CN), Canada's largest
railway; shortly thereafter, CN Intermodal carried one-eighth of Canada
Post's long-haul (greater than 350 miles) container traffic nationwide, and as
much as one-fourth in major corridors such as Montreal/Toronto to western
Canada. 165 Also under the agreement, CN's Intermodal Logistics Centre will
"allocate equipment and train capacity [to Canada Post], and provide
personalized service and status updates to [Canada Post] on a seven-day/24-
hour basis."'1 66 In the words of one CN employee: "We monitor our own
performance to ensure that Canada Post shipments are on schedule."''
67
Clearly, contracting for such transportation does not exhibit natural
monopoly properties. Any customer of those transportation firms is equally
capable of procuring such services.
Canada Post depends on the ability of competitive transportation firms to
provide information support to facilitate package exchange. Important
developments in electronic data interchange and computerized reservation
systems have drastically improved the efficiency of freight transportation.
Those efficiencies are widely exploited by private companies and extend
easily to transportation of mail, packages, and freight containers currently
handled by the postal system. In fact, Canada Post's chief executive officer
has said that it is more efficient for Canada Post to rely on publicly available
164. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
165. Canadian National Earns Canada Post "Stamp of Approval," CAN. NEWSWIRE, June 28,
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information technology: "[W]e found out that our information technology
staff tended to re-invent what was already out in the market."'
' 68
2. Regional Sortation and Transportation
Regional sortation and transportation also are not natural monopolies.
Transportation by truck does not exhibit any natural monopoly properties.
Although there may be organizational economies in coordinating and
operating transportation systems, regional transportation can be provided by
multiple carriers. Certainly no one would suggest that a region is best served
by a single trucking company.
Regional sortation is not a natural monopoly either. Although there may
be substantial economies of scale at the level of the individual sorting plant,
this does not imply that a single company should operate all of the sorting
plants across the country, or even within a region. The technology and
distribution of regional sortation differs little from warehousing by
wholesalers or retail chains for general merchandise, such as Safeway or Wal-
Mart. No one would seriously suggest that wholesale supply of general
merchandise be provided by a single company. In short, the notion that
regional sortation and delivery have natural monopoly properties is not
defensible.
3. Local Collection, Sortation, and Delivery
If there is no naturally monopolistic production technology for regional
sortation and transportation or for long-distance transportation, then Canada
Post can be a natural monopoly only if local collection, sortation, and delivery
exhibit characteristics of natural monopoly and do so in sufficient magnitude
to dominate the constant or decreasing returns to scale found in regional
sortation and transportation and in long-distance transportation.'69 Several
economists have argued that economies of scale exist in the local delivery of
mail.1 70 As we shall see, however, such economies are limited in nature and
do not suggest the need for entry restrictions into letter mail or government
control of Canada Post. Even the existence of such economies would not be
sufficient evidence from which to conclude that a single firm should control
all local service throughout Canada. At most, such economies would imply
that each locality should have a single service provider.17 1
168. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
169. See George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J.
POL. EcON. 185 (1951), reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 129 (1968).
170. See sources cited supra note 160.
171. Sharon Oster has proposed that the U.S. Postal Service be divided into regional firms akin to
the seven regional Bell operating companies formed by the AT&T breakup. Sharon M. Oster, The Postal
Service as a Public Enterprise, in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 31,
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Moreover, the existence of local economies of scale would not justify
unified control of the other two components of Canada Post-regional
sortation and transportation, and contracting for long-distance transportation.
Even if there were vertical economies from combining local service with
regional sortation and delivery, that condition would not justify horizontal
integration across all localities; rather, it would support the creation of
multiple vertical networks. Such a development would be roughly analogous
to the growth of competing full-service networks in telecommunications. 2
Network externalities are said to exist if adding more customers or points
of access to a network increases benefits or lowers costs to the existing
customers of the network. Thus, telephone subscribers benefit from
companies' hooking up additional customers because they can reach or be
reached by more people. Even if network economies are present, that need not
imply that there should be only one network operator and owner. Networking
benefits can be achieved by interconnecting multiple networks. Moreover,
portions of any given network can be owned and operated independently,
with interconnections achieved through contracts. The analogy between postal
networks and telecommunications, rail, and electric power networks is a
tenuous one in any case. The local postal network bears little resemblance to
those networks, because there are no location-specific transmission or rail
lines that require substantial capital investment. The postal routes covered by
persons can be duplicated with relatively low capital expenditures.
The postal network may exhibit coordination economies in a particular
form, as evidenced by the use of hub-and-spoke systems by competing private
carriers. Such a pattern does not imply that only one network should operate,
nor does it suggest that the government must own and operate such a network.
Moreover, the coordination problems differ little from those of any
transportation or wholesale company that must sort and route packages from
one address to another. Those are routine functions that are effectively
performed by private companies. The coordination problems required for
reliability by telecommunications or electricity networks are much more
complex, require far more rapid responses, and have more severe
consequences. Yet, even in those types of networks, coordination is achieved
through contractual agreements and cooperation councils extending across
individual companies.
Local service has three components: inward sortation by postal carriers,
door-to-door delivery by postal carriers in trucks and on foot, and collection
of mail at mailboxes and post offices. Those three elements involve well-
understood, traditional technology. Economies of scale in those activities are
172. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETMON IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 10-19 (1994); J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209,
1223-27 (1993) (book review).
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minimal. The productive inputs involved, primarily labor services and
vehicles, can be "smoothly" adjusted to reflect the volume of mail.
a. Inward Sortation
The inward sortation function can be split among multiple firms without
a loss in efficiency. Just as inward sortation is split across postal employees, it
can be split across companies. Indeed, larger mailers perform a degree of
inward sortation to qualify for presort discounts. 173 In fact, Canada Post has
encouraged discounts for bulk mailers who presort to reflect customer
capabilities and reduce Canada Post's costs.1 74 There are no apparent econo-
mies of scale of any significance for inward sortation.
b. Door-to-Door Delivery
The traditional natural monopoly argument emphasizes door-to-door
delivery by postal carriers in trucks and on foot. In 1848, John Stuart Mill
suggested the need to avoid duplication of effort by pedestrian postmen
serving a given street in London:
As a general rule, the expenses of a business do not increase by any
means proportionally to the quantity of business. Let us take as an
example, a set of operations which we are accustomed to see carried
on by one great establishment, that of the Post Office. Suppose that
the business, let us say only of the London letter-post, instead of
being centralized in a single concern, were divided among five or
six competing companies. Each of these would be obliged to
maintain almost as large an establishment as is now sufficient for
the whole. Since each must arrange for receiving and delivering
letters in all parts of the town, each must send letter-carriers into
every street, and almost every alley, and this too as many times in
the day as is now done by the Post Office, if the service is to be as
well performed. Each must have an office for receiving letters in
every neighborhood, with all subsidiary arrangements for collecting
the letters from the different offices and re-distributing them. I say
nothing of the much greater number of superior officers who would
be required to check and control the subordinates, implying not only
a greater cost in salaries for such responsible officers, but the
necessity, perhaps, of being satisfied in many instances with an
inferior standard of qualification, and so failing in the object. 75
173. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 15.
174. Id.
175. 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 164-65 (2d ed. 1848).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
Those economies of scale may have existed 150 years ago in London, but
it is far from obvious today that any appreciable economies of scale obtain
with the higher mail volumes and population densities in Canadian cities and
suburbs.
Certainly the volumetric limits of a mail truck, as well as the weight and
volumetric limits of a mail carrier's bag, imply decreasing returns to scale
when the quantity of mail being delivered to a neighborhood reaches a certain
level. Even in rural areas, where population density may be low, modem
transportation vehicles allow deliveries over a wider area. Even if there are
cost savings from having a single delivery provider for rural areas, that
condition need not preclude private provision of such service. Even rural
areas may be served by multiple newspaper delivery routes, which
demonstrates that an extremely low-cost service can be maintained simply for
the delivery of one item on a daily basis to a substantial proportion of
households. In short, nothing inherent in the technology of truck driying and
walking justifies government ownership and control of Canada Post or a
monopoly in the delivery of letter mail.
A second alleged economy of scale in door-to-door delivery arises
because the cost of making a delivery to a particular location does not depend
on the number of pieces delivered there. That relationship means that Canada
Post can lower the average cost of delivering letters to a particular location by
increasing the number of pieces delivered. That cost condition does not
necessarily imply that only one delivery service should exist, for the rate at
which average costs fall depends on the chosen frequency of delivery. A
reduction in the frequency of delivery increases the likelihood that multiple
pieces will be delivered to a given household and thus reduces the average
cost of delivery. Households may differ in their frequency requirements so
that not all require daily delivery. Multiple delivery services can provide
services of varying quality at lower cost.
Furthermore, to the extent that Canada Post can achieve economies of
scale in delivery, they may reflect an absence of any effective oversight of
Canada Post's discretion to set standards for quality of service. 176 Canada
Post can influence the extent of economies of scale in delivery by the level of
quality it sets-such as the number of deliveries per day or week, the average
number of days necessary to deliver a letter, and so forth. Economies of scale
in delivery (that is, the probability that there will be two or more pieces for
delivery to a single mail stop on a given delivery run) increase as delivery
becomes less frequent, the mail stream moves more slowly, the volume of
non-time-sensitive mail rises, and non-time-sensitive mail is priced at lower
levels that reflect a smaller allocation of common fixed costs. Thus, to the
176. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Economics of Mail Delivery: Commentary, in GOVERNING THE
POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 14, 14-15.
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extent that Canada Post's intellectual defense for the continuation of the
statutory monopoly over letter mail is predicated on the existence of scale
economies in delivery, Canada Post can increase the magnitude of those
economies-though at a cost to consumers-by attributing as few costs as
possible to other classes of mail.
Stated differently, if the frequency of delivery were market driven,
Canada Post's alleged economies of scale would vanish. We do not observe,
for example, "natural monopoly" delivery services in each metropolitan or
rural area that act as common carriers for delivering pizza, appliances,
furniture, or nursery products. Why not? Because any gains from exploiting
economies of scale are more than offset by other aspects of service quality
that derive from controlling one's own delivery network.
A third potential reason of economies of scale in door-to-door delivery is
that, increasingly, a postman does not really go all the way to the customer's
door. The delivery of mail in new suburban neighborhoods, for example, is
typically to a group of boxes that may be seventy-five feet or more from the
customer's home. Canada Post has increasingly replaced door-step service
with delivery to such community or cluster mailboxes. 77 The customer then,
in effect, completes the last leg of the delivery. He cannot pay Canada Post to
deliver to his door; that is, consumers cannot buy higher-quality mail service
from Canada Post the way they can buy higher-quality services from private
suppliers of goods and services. This truncation of services offered by Canada
Post directly relates to the perception of economies of scale in delivery.
Aggregated mailboxes in newer neighborhoods, for example, reduce the cost
of delivery for Canada Post but impose a delivery cost on mail recipients, who
must walk from their homes to get their mail. That cost will vary from
consumer to consumer and could be considerable for some, such as an older
person forced to walk in snowy, rainy, or icy conditions to her mailbox. Thus,
the economies of scale that some claim to exist over the delivery function may
come at greater private cost to consumers. If so, they are false economies
indeed.178
177. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 23.
178. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Economics of Mail Delivery: Commentary, in GOVERNING THE
POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 15-16. In remarks concerning the U.S. Postal Service, Judge
Douglas Ginsburg, who was formerly Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, has noted that a consum-
er
cannot buy door-to-door service because, under the postal regulation, the mail goes only to
the street .... [Further], there is only daily service, and increasingly less of it. You cannot
sign up for twice-daily service. And you cannot say, "l'T pay less to receive twice-weekly
service," because you do not pay on the receiving end. This high degree of uniformity and
standardization that has become normal in the Postal Service--even the postal box has to
conform to postal regulations-is emblematic of the potential loss in consumer satisfaction,
consumer surplus, and consumer welfare that we associate with the old integrated telephone
system.
The Economics of Mail Delivery: Discussion, in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at
19 (remarks of Douglas H. Ginsburg).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
c. Collection of Mail
Just as with long-distance transportation and inward sortation, Canada
Post itself has demonstrated that collection of mail at its retail access points
cannot be considered to have natural monopoly characteristics. Canada Post
distributes its services through nearly 18,500 retail access points.179 Private
businesses operate approximately 75% of those retail outlets. 80 Furthermore,
there is nothing inherent in government ownership and control over retail
locations and the equipment used to provide local distribution service that
would suggest the presence of cost savings from unified ownership and con-
trol. That Canada Post recognizes that fact is evidenced by its initiative to
lease operating equipment to enhance operational flexibility and reduce
spending.' 8' Canada Post also contracts out its property management function
because, according to its chief executive officer, "we are not managers of real
estate-and this result[s] in huge savings. ' 82
4. Summary and Implications
None of the components of postal service----contracting for long-distance
transportation, regional sortation and transportation, or local collection,
sortation, and delivery--exhibits the natural monopoly property. That
conclusion comports with Mr. Clermont's observation that "[m]ost of our
'non-core' operations are contracted out."' 83 Canada Post's continued
statutory monopoly over letter mail therefore cannot rest on the assertion that
it reaps the benefits of a natural monopoly technology for Canadian
consumers. There are, consequently, no cost-efficiency grounds for restricting
entry or preventing competition in Canadian postal markets.
D. The Fallacy That Canada Post Must Be a Nationwide Full-Service
Carrier
Economies of scope are used to justify preserving a multiproduct natural
monopoly for Canada Post. Moreover, the possibility of achieving additional
economies of scope by expansion into new markets is used to argue for
extension of the postal monopoly. Canada Post seeks to increase its presence
in parcel post, express mail, and other services because it is asserted that there
are increasing returns to producing those services jointly with letter mail. The
179. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 2.
180. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 13.
181. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 23.
182. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
183. Id.
Vol. 14:1, 1997
Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post
reasoning seems to be that any additional contribution to overhead, no matter
how small, justifies a new line of business.
A firm's technology is said to exhibit economies of scope if a single fim
can produce two products at a lower cost than if each product were produced
by a different firm. 184 The cost of producing one of the products alone is its
stand-alone cost.185 Economies of scope are said to exist if the sum of the
stand-alone costs of the two products exceeds the cost of joint production. In
the multiproduct' case, a production technology is said to have the natural
monopoly property if a single firm can provide the bundle of products (such
as cars and trucks, or the delivery of letters and parcels) at a lower cost than
can two or more firms.
Economies of scope often stem from sharing joint and common costs
across a range of services. That sharing might take the form of common
overhead costs for the production of multiple products or services. The use of
hub-and-spoke systems in network industries creates economies of scope if
the usage density is higher on each branch in comparison with a point-to-
point system. The sharing of trunk lines to connect multiple branches in a
network creates economies of scope in comparison with stand-alone systems
that duplicate the trunk-line facility.
An assessment of economies of scope depends on how the firm's
products or services are defined. Products can be delineated arbitrarily on the
basis of product features, customer characteristics, location, time available,
brand names, and so on. Postal services such as standard letter mail, parcel
post, and express mail represent arbitrary historical classifications based
largely on the content of the mail. Those services can share overhead
depending on how the postal delivery service is organized.
Yet, for the same reasons that it is implausible that the production
technology for postal delivery exhibits the natural monopoly property, it is
also implausible that there are substantial economies of scope in postal
delivery. Because transportation is contracted out to independent carriers,
Canada Post cannot be said to realize any economies of scope at this stage;
the fact that multiple independent providers actually perform the
transportation services negates any economies of scope resulting from a single
service provider. Regional sortation and delivery can exhibit economies of
scope only to the extent that two types of mail are routed through the same
facilities. Local delivery can exhibit some economies of scope again to the
extent that, say, first and third class mail are sorted and delivered together,
but not if the services are provided independently.
184. An early exposition of economies of scope is John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies
of Scale in Multi-Output Production, 91 Q.J. ECON. 481 (1977). For subsequent discussions, see
SPULBER, supra note 161, at 114-17.
185. See, e.g., BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 172, at 58-59.
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In any case, the presence of economies of scope is not sufficient to justify
the postal monopoly. Multiple carriers can each achieve economies of scope if
each offers multiple services. United Parcel Service, for example, offers
delivery for both overnight mail and parcels.
Moreover, economies of scope do not justify extending the postal
monopoly. On the contrary, the presence of economies of scope would more
plausibly imply the need to eliminate the postal monopoly. There are currently
private carriers of express mail-such as Federal Express and United Parcel
Service, to name only two-that are not permitted to carry standard letter
mail. If there are economies of scope between standard letter mail and express
mail service, those private carriers could realize those economies if Canada
Post did not have an exclusive privilege over standard letter mail. Thus,
potential economies of scope do not imply any need to extend the
government's postal monopoly. Rather, they imply the need to extend the
range of permissible privately supplied services.
A private firm considering entry into a market will determine whether its
stand-alone cost for a given product would be less than the prevailing price
for that product in that market.' 86 Of course, the prospective entrant is free to
enter by simultaneously offering two or more products over which it can
achieve economies of scope. For example, because an alternative advertising
carrier already provides service to a neighborhood, the carrier's cost of enter-
ing the business of delivering letters no longer would be the stand-alone cost
of letter delivery; rather, the cost of entry would be the incremental cost of
adding letter delivery given that the carrier already delivers unaddressed
advertising. Stated differently, the cost to the alternative advertising carrier of
entering the letter delivery business would be the stand-alone cost of letter
delivery minus the economies of scope (on a unit basis) derivable from the
firm's joint delivery of unaddressed advertising and letter mail.
The same analysis of the incremental cost of entry would apply to the
multiproduct activities of Canada Post were it not for the fact that the firm is
a publicly owned and controlled enterprise. Canada Post offers many different
services. If competition exists for all but the provision of letter mail, it is
unnecessary for Canada Post to offer its letter mail service in conjunction
with one or more of the other services even if Canada Post could achieve
economies of scope by providing them jointly with the one noncompetitive
class of mail. To conclude otherwise is to succumb to the fallacy that Canada
Post must be a nationwide full-service carrier of all varieties of mail. To the
contrary, the proper scope of market entry by a government-owned firm
should be defined by the scope of the market failure that this form of govern-
ment intervention seeks to redress, not by the cost-minimizing scope of a
public firm that produces both competitive and noncompetitive products. In-
deed, if significant economies of scope exist between competitive and non-
186. Id. at77-78.
Vol. 14:1, 1997
Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post
competitive products, then the more natural question to ask is why the
superior regime is not private provision of all the products, subject perhaps to
the usual price regulation, safeguards, cost allocation, and nondiscrimination
requirements in the sale of access to bottleneck facilities, and so forth.
In its most recent corporate plan, Canada Post expresses its belief that
"[i]ncreasingly, customers are looking for a single distributor to handle their
needs in an increasingly borderless market."' 87 What drives Canada Post in its
expansionist movement is its conviction that to remain a viable economic
entity, it must be a nationwide full-service provider of communication,
transportation, and delivery services. That assumption, however, has no basis
in economic theory. If competition is feasible in a particular class of mail, as
the evidence in parcel post and overnight mail amply demonstrates, then there
is no market failure necessitating government involvement in the first place.
There is a fortiori no need for the government itself to provide such service
and thereby to compete against private firms.
The same reasoning applies to the geographic scope of coverage for a
particular service that private firms are capable of providing: There is no need
for Canada Post to provide that service in locales where private firms can
profitably provide it. It is doubtful, for example, that any postal service in
Toronto or Montreal must be provided by a public enterprise. As a practical
matter, of course, the geographic scope of private services is not an issue of
controversy, because firms like United Parcel Service, Federal Express, and
even Canada Post's Purolator Courier provide service throughout Canada.
Economic analysis offers no rationale why Canada Post should have to
provide consumers every type of mail service or provide any particular type of
service to consumers in all regions of the country. Sound public policy
dictates that a government-owned entity should produce only those postal
services which some form of market failure prevents private firms from
profitably providing to consumers. The practical implication of that principle
is that Canada Post should aspire to do less by exiting any market that is
demonstrably competitive.
E. Recapitulation
Canada Post is not a natural monopoly. In contracting for long-distance
transportation, in regional sortation and transportation, and in local collection,
sortation, and delivery, the assertion that Canada Post is a natural monopoly
is implausible as a matter of economic analysis. If anything, economic
analysis suggests that Canada Post has considerable incentive and latitude to
truncate consumer choices so as to increase the false appearance that
economies of scale and scope exist in local delivery. There is no intellectually
187. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note' 8, at 8.
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defensible argument that Canada Post's statutory monopoly flows directly
from a natural monopoly that it purports to possess over mail delivery.
To the contrary, if economies of scope exist between letter mail and other
classes of mail, that fact would strongly support elimination of Canada Post's
exclusive privilege rather than expansion of the enterprise into competitive
lines of business. Sound public policy should encourage the entry of private
firms into mail services currently monopolized by the Canadian government
rather than extend the government's monopoly into markets that private firms
have already proven to be competitive.
III. Public Provision of Postal Services
It is not necessary for the government to provide the full range of postal
services that consumers demand. Continued public provision of postal ser-
vices runs counter to the movement toward privatization in numerous
industries in many countries throughout the world, including Canada. 188 The
following analysis shows that public provision of postal services in Canada
cannot be justified on the basis of market failure. It is apparent that
competitive private firms effectively provide a wide variety of communica-
tion, transportation, and delivery services. The elimination of government
restrictions on entry into postal services would lead to a significant increase in
privately provided services.
The two principal reasons given today for public provision of postal
services are the social goal of providing universal service, and the need to
ensure the security of the mail stream. In an era long since passed, the postal
service was admittedly an essential component of a nation's infrastructure.' 89
Canada Post's chief executive officer still embraces that view: "Postal
administrations are mandated to serve the whole country, however remote the
area. It is one of those intangible things that forms a nation."'190 That
statement had greater validity when the only two means of communication
were face-to-face conversation and transportation of written words, but times
have changed drastically, Those historical justifications need not detain our
current analysis, for technological change and market developments now pro-
vide many alternative means of communication that have long since
eliminated the need to rely on a national postal service to achieve those
objectives. Indeed, the elimination of those outdated justifications reveals
188. See George L. Priest, Socialism, Eastern Europe, and the Question of the Postal Monopoly,
in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 46. For a discussion of the extensive
privatization initiatives in the United Kingdom, see JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988). For a discussion of privatization of postal services, see Michael A.
Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Pricing, Entry, Service Quality, and Innovation under a Commercialized
Postal Service, in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 151-57.
189. See RUTH LAPHAM BUTLER, DOCTOR FRANKLIN POSTMASTER GENERAL (1928).
190. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
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how intellectually flimsy is the case for continued public provision of postal
services.
The two contemporary justifications for public provision of postal
services are inconsistent with current technological and market developments
in communications, transportation, and delivery services in Canada. There is,
consequently, no reason to continue public provision of the full range of
postal services. Postal delivery has no insurmountable technological barriers
to entry, and, indeed, extensive competitive provision of postal services
already occurs. Further, postal services need not be publicly provided either to
ensure ubiquity of service and pricing uniformity or to ensure the integrity of
the mail stream.
A. The Absence of Insurmountable Technological Barriers to Entry in
Postal Delivery
There do not appear to be any insurmountable technological barriers to
entry in postal delivery. An economic entry barrier is a cost that must be
borne by an entrant but not by an incumbent. 191 The main barrier to entry that
raises concerns in a regulated market is the problem of sunk costs. An
incumbent firm can write off its irreversible costs of capital and thus only
need be concerned about its variable costs in setting its prices. In contrast, an
entrant not only must recover variable costs, but also must earn revenues that
cover its irreversible entry costs. Sunk costs are a concern in network
industries such as electricity and natural gas because the costs of transmission
facilities are irreversible and transaction-specific. 1
92
The postal system is often referred to as a network industry because any
transportation and delivery system has many of the features of a network,
particularly in terms of dispersed collection and delivery and of centralized
sorting. 193 That analogy does not, however, imply that the capital equipment
of a postal delivery system is in any way comparable to that of a transmission
network composed of pipelines or electric lines. To the contrary, equipment
for the postal system is far from being an irreversible investment and is
certainly not transaction-specific.
Canada Post's capital consists of buildings, vehicles, and sorting equip-
ment. The buildings, which often are leased rather than owned, can be put to
191. SPULBER, supra note 161, at 40-41; GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
67 (1968); William J. Baumol & Robert D. Wi~lig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers and
Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405, 418 (1981).
192. As Paul Milgrom and John Roberts note, "the specificity of an asset is measured as the
percentage of investment value that is lost when the asset is used outside the specific setting or
relationship." PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 135
(1992) (emphasis in original). Both fixed and variable costs may have components that are transaction-
specific and, thus, nonsalvageable. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITrTONS OF
CAPITALISM 52-56 (1985).
193. See sources cited supra note 160.
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other uses and are not tied to any particular customer location. 194 Vehicles are
obviously mobile assets. The services of sorting equipment, while specialized,
are not tied to a particular customer, for they can be transferred across
markets simply by transporting the items to be sorted to and from different
locations. Those assets, such as sorting equipment and vehicles, have
relatively short economic lives-unlike transmission facilities in such
network industries as natural gas, electric power, and long-distance
telecommunication-and thus do not represent an insurmountable barrier to
entry. Therefore, sunk costs are not large in the postal services industry.
Furthermore, competitive entry into delivery services already has
occurred. Indeed, for express service and parcels, Purolator (before Canada
Post purchased a majority interest) and United Parcel Service already have
established prominent positions in increasingly large markets. Actual
competitive entry demonstrates conclusively that entry barriers are not an
issue.
Many package delivery services operating in North America have made
substantial investments in delivery. Companies in package delivery include
Air Express International, Airborne Freight, American Freightways, Consoli-
dated Freightways, DHL Worldwide Express, Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
Roadway Services, Inc., and United Parcel Service; express carriers include
Federal Express, United Parcel Service, Airborne Freight, and Em-
ery/Purolator, Loomis Courier Service, and Canpar Transport Ltd.195 In
Canada alone, there are currently well over 2,000 companies competing in the
small parcel express market.196 The rapid rate of growth and economic suc-
cess of those firms show that the cost of investment is not preventing
competitive entry into postal delivery. The same holds in the United States for
the growth and planned expansion of second and third class mail delivery
companies, such as Alternate Postal Delivery, Inc. (formerly United Delivery
Systems, Inc.), 197 and Time Warner's Publishers Express, Inc.198 The
technology of those delivery services can be adapted to other types of mail,
including letter mail. In short, private firms clearly are capable of providing
postal services.
194. See Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
195. See, e.g., AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORP., 1994 SEC FORM 10-K, at 3 (1995); AMERICAN
FREIGHTWAYS CORP., 1994 SEC FORM 10-K, at 3 (1995); CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS, INC., 1994
SEC FORM 10-K, at 3-5 (1995); CORPORATE PROFILE FOR DHL WORLDWIDE ExPRESS, Bus. WIRE, INC.
(Sept. 9, 1994); FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP., 1994 SEC FORM 10-K, at 1 (1994); GREYHOUND LINES, INC.,
1994 SEC FORM 10-K, at 3 (1995); ROADWAY SERVICES, INC., 1994 SEC FORM 10-K, at 1-5 (1995);
BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORPORATIONIPUROLATOR COURIER INC., supra note 135, at 5.
196. BACKGROUNDER: CANADA POST CORP.IPUROLATOR COURIER, supra note 135, at 6.
197. ALTERNATE POSTAL DELIVERY, INC., SEC FORM S-I REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING OF 1,000,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK (Aug. 2, 1995).
198. TIME WARNER INC., 1994 SEC FORM 10-K, at 1-8 (1995).
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B. Cost Economies Do Not Justify Public Provision of Postal Services
Although mail delivery is clearly not a natural monopoly for the reasons
explained in Part H, any cost economies, if they did exist, still would not
justify public provision of the full range of postal services by Canada Post.
First, public ownership of an enterprise often implies that incentives for
productive efficiency and cost minimization are absent. Second, private
ownership of the facilities does not in any way impair the efficient operation
of those facilities.
The possibility that technological cost economies may be present does not
guarantee that they will be achieved. In his landmark study of economies of
scale and scope, the business historian Alfred D. Chandler observes that
managerial skill is required to attain those economies that are technologically
available. 199 Private owners have an incentive to maximize profits because
they are the residual claimants to the returns on their investment. That state of
affairs gives private owners an incentive to engage in oversight of managerial
performance to guarantee that productive efficiency is achieved and that costs
are minimized. Owners will likely provide managers with incentives for cost
minimization. Canada Post has the option to issue shares to its employees, but
it has not done so and gives no indication that it will issue any shares to any
employees until 1999.200 Thus, under Canada Post's present government
ownership, incentives for profit maximization are likely to be subordinate to
political considerations.
Public ownership eliminates or severely reduces monitoring and oversight
incentives. As a consequence, public ownership and control reduce incentives
for cost minimization. For example, Canada Post has invested heavily in
automation but has failed to achieve technical efficiencies. In 1994, Canada
Post invested $208 million in capital assets, and, in 1995, it invested an
additional $132 million.20 1 Since Canada Post operates fewer than 4,600 of its
own retail outlets and contracts out much of its transportation services, most
of that investment is presumably in automated equipment.2 2 During that
same period, however, total employment (measured in millions of hours paid)
increased by more than 5%.203 The U.S. Postal Service has demonstrated the
same inability to achieve cost savings through investment in automation.2 04 In
February 1995, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded: "The
199. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 17
(1990). See also Daniel F. Spulber, Economic Analysis and Management Strategy: A Survey Continued,
3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 355, 378 (1994).
200. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 13.
201. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 25.
202. See PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REvIEW, supra note 14; Clermont Testimony, supra
note 52.
203. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 36.
204. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POSTAL SERVICE: AUTOMATION Is TAKING LONGER
AND PRODUCING LESS THAN EXPECTED 2 (1995).
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savings from automation continue to be small compared to overall labor costs
and more difficult to achieve than the Service anticipated., 211 Similarly,
Professors Paul MacAvoy and George Mclsaac found that the Postal Service's
automation program, the largest capitalization plan in any public sector
service organization in the 1980s and 1990s, caused the Postal Service to
have significantly higher capital costs but not significantly lower labor
costs.
206
Private ownership of the facilities used to deliver mail certainly would not
prevent a company from achieving cost economies. Moreover, economic
analysis shows that the presence of competitive firms leads to economies of
scale in a market, for the pressure of potential competition from new entrants
encourages pricing and cost discipline to incumbent firms. That incentive
means that competitive firms would realize.the technologically available
economies of scale. Moreover, economic analysis shows that the existence of
economies of scale in a market is consistent with the presence of competitive
firms, for the pressure of potential competition from new entrants provides
pricing and cost discipline to incumbent firms. Thus, the natural monopoly
argument is not a sufficient condition for barring entry into the market for
letter mail because competitive, privately owned companies can realize the
benefits of any increasing returns to scale that they might obtain.
C. Public Provision Is Not Needed to Ensure Ubiquity and Pricing
Uniformity
Perhaps the most popular argument for public ownership and control of
Canada Post is to ensure reliable postal service throughout the country with
the same quality of service for communities of similar size, as required by the
Canada Post Corporation Act.20 7 The shorthand for that objective is
"universal service." Unlike the U.S. Postal Service, which by statute must
price its service uniformly throughout the country, Canada Post is not
required by its postal statutes to provide universal service at uniform rates;
nonetheless, Canada Post provides letter mail at a uniform rate, currently
450.208 The legislation requires only that Canada Post provide "a basic
customary postal service at fair and reasonable rates" and that it maintain "a
standard of service that will meet the needs of the people of Canada and that
is similar with respect to communities of the same size." 2°9 Nevertheless,
Canada Post has maintained that its "central public policy function" is "to
205. Id.
206. PAUL W. MACAVOY & GEORGE S. McIsAAc, THE CURRENT FILE ON THE CASE FOR
PRIVATIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES 121 (Hume Papers on Pub. Pol'y, No.3,
1995).
207. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 5 (1985) (Can.).
208. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 14.
209. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 66.
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provide universal letter service at affordable, uniform rates. ' 210 The Review
concurs with Canada Post's position.2
Canada Post views universal service as the justification not only for
retaining its existing monopoly over letter mail, but also for expanding its
operations in competitive markets. With the decrease in standard letter mail
volume and the increase in costs (particularly labor costs), Canada Post
recognizes that its continued existence depends on growth from other lines of
business. "Confronted with the reality of increasingly aggressive competition,
higher service expectations from customers, and an explosion of new
communication technologies," notes Mr. Clermont, Canada Post's key
objective is to become "our customers' supplier of choice., 21 2 Presumably
referring to a perceived need to become a vertically integrated full-service
provider of communication, transportation, and delivery services, Mr.
Clermont reveals Canada Post's concern over becoming irrelevant in the face
of the proliferation of cheaper alternatives to letter mail.213 Canada Post's
corporate plan states that for its continued prosperity "[t]he Corporation must
develop a new direction to improve profitability and improve the business. 214
That "new direction" involves Canada Post's redefinition of its universal
service mandate to justify the firm's entry into emerging information markets:
"Just as [Canada Post] has made universal, affordable and reliable delivery of
mail possible for all Canadians and businesses, it has a role to play in
ensuring universality of service in an electronic industry that may not
otherwise emerge on an equal access basis." 215 The difficulty of defining and
funding a universal service policy for interactive broadband networks
suggests that the expanded role that Canada Post envisions for itself could
result in a serious misallocation of public and private resources.216
A postal monopoly may also tend to exaggerate the importance of its
universal service function to elevate the apparent significance of its existence.
For example, the U.S. Postal Service publicly romanticizes its universal
service function in a manner that surely is disproportionate to the magnitude
of that undertaking. In May 1995, for example, the Postal Service took out a
quarter-page advertisement on the op-ed page of the New York Times to tout
its deliveries by bush pilot above the Arctic Circle and by mailboat in the
Louisiana bayous. 217 Those deliveries to remote, high-cost areas also include
210. Id. at 67.
211. Id.
212. CANADA POST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 2.
213. See Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
214. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 7.
215. Id.
216. See Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition and Regulatory Policies for
Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1213-28 (1995).
217. N.Y. TIMEs, May 12, 1995, at A31 (Postal Service advertisement). The weekday price of a
quarter-page advertisement running one time on the op-ed page of the New York Times is $18,315 (U.S.).
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Supai, Arizona, where, the Postal Service explains, pack mules must negotiate
eight miles of trails down the south rim of the Grand Canyon to deliver not
only mail, but also food and furniture to the Havasupai Indian Reservation
below.218 One wonders how the Havasupai managed to procure food and
furniture before the U.S. mail came along. One can ask similar questions
about groceries and tires delivered by the U.S. Postal Service to the Alaskan
wilderness.219
Canada Post's policy of uniform pricing for standard letter mail may have
an efficiency justification in the sense that it reduces the transaction costs of
sending mail. Of course, it also has a powerful distributional effect, as the
Supai mule trail illustrates in the United States. Given the differences in the
cost of delivery between urban and rural areas, uniform pricing necessarily
implies that some customers will subsidize other customers. Is public control
of postal services the only means to achieve ubiquity of service, uniformity of
pricing, and subsidies to high-cost delivery areas? The answer is plainly no. Is
public control the most efficient means of achieving those social policies?
Again, no.
First, private firms like Federal Express and United Parcel Service
provide ubiquitous service at a uniform price, which in turn implies a
subsidization of high-cost recipients of overnight mail and parcels. The
accomplishment of such distributional effects therefore does not require either
public ownership or control of postal services.
Second, private firms demonstrate regularly that they are better able than
Canada Post to provide service at low cost. Political judgment has determined
that certain services, such as delivery of goods to the North, should be priced
below cost.220 Canada Post contracts out much of that service to private
carriers. 221 The continued reliance on Canada Post's monopoly over letter
mail, however, forecloses experimentation with alternative mechanisms for
the private provision of postal service to high-cost areas, even under
continued government subsidies. In particular, in the absence of the statutory
monopoly, it would be possible for the federal government to invite bids from
private firms to provide mail service to a particular remote area and to assume
the obligation of being the carrier of last resort. Postal customers in that
region would continue to pay a nationally uniform price for mail, and private
firms would submit competing bids to provide such service for the lowest
subsidy to be paid by the federal government. The process would not
fundamentally differ from that by which the baker submitting the lowest bid
Telephone interview between Marshall Smith, American Enterprise Institute, and Janine Lloyd, New York
Times Advertising Dep't, May 23, 1995.
218. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 20 (1993).
219. See The Economics of Mail Delivery: Discussion, in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE,
supra note 160, at 21-22.
220. PRICE WATERHOUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 14.
221. Id.
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is awarded the contract to supply bread to a military base. An alternative
method of providing universal service would be to give subsidies directly to
postal customers and then allow Canada Post (or any other carrier) to charge
customers a price reflecting the true cost of service.
In short, the pursuit of social goals does not require Canada Post to have
a statutory monopoly or to distort postal pricing. The federal government can
instead provide subsidies through either of the contracting mechanisms just
described. Universal service does not require public control of postal services.
Of course, to say that alternative financing schemes for universal service exist
is not to say that it would be politically easy to adopt them in lieu of the
current scheme of cross-subsidies. The schemes developed by federal and
state governments to provide "universality" across infrastructure industries,
including public utilities, have repeatedly involved the internal collection of
the cross-subsidy by the franchised monopoly firm that provides commercial
services of the same kind.222 Integrating universal and commercial services in
a monopoly provider's "internal tax system" helps to conceal the magnitude
and recipients of the cross-subsidy. If those facts were made explicit, the
cross-subsidy might prove to be politically embarrassing and cause voters to
demand that Parliament end or reduce it.
D. Public Provision Is Not Needed to Ensure the Integrity of the Mail
Stream
The need to maintain the security of the mail stream is another justifica-
tion given for public ownership of Canada Post. It is unlikely, however, that a
public enterprise is better able than private firms to provide secure
communications and shipments. The experience from the United States
indicates that the Postal Service's own record of reliability and security is
problematic. The purpose of the following discussion is not to impute to
Canada Post the derelictions of the U.S. Postal Service, but rather to provide a
case study of how one prominent public enterprise failed spectacularly in its
mission to provide a secure mail-stream.
1. Private Provision of Secure Communications and Deliveries
Public control of postal services is not needed to ensure security for at
least three reasons. First, the private sector already offers consumers reliable
alternatives to the mail for secure communications, such as parcel post and
express mail. Private firms could easily extend those services to letter mail.
Moreover, the reliability argument is obsolete because it neglects other
reliable alternatives to communication by mail such as newspapers, radio,
222. See Crandall & Sidak, supra note 216, at 1213-28.
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television, telecommunications, and electronic communication (e.g., e-mail
and facsimile).
Second, the private sector offers consumers an array of security options
for their communications and shipments. The market offers many types of
security arrangements ranging from specialized couriers to armored cars.
Parcel delivery companies have developed bar-coded tracking systems that
ensure security and accuracy in locating packages. Those innovations and
varied product offerings of private firms respond to the fact that the security
needs of individual mailers vary. In contrast, public control of the postal
system is more likely to produce a uniform level of security that is not tailored
to individual needs and risk preferences.
Third, Canada Post already contracts out the transportation of mail to
private airlines, railroads, and trucking firms. 223 That fact indicates that the
federal government does not consider itself the only party trustworthy enough
to handle the mail.
2. Reputational Effects of Criminal Wrongdoing or Negligence by
Postal Employees
In the United States, recent press reports of the Postal Service's improper
handling of the mail present evidence that public ownership and control of the
postal system does not guarantee the integrity of the mail system. Empirical
studies have established that U.S. Postal Service workers earn a wage
premium of approximately 20% over the earnings of workers performing
comparable tasks in the private sector.22 4 If the Postal Service were unique in
its ability to ensure the integrity of the mail stream, that wage premium could
be regarded as a bonding mechanism-a quasi rent that postal employees
would lose if discharged from their jobs for compromising the integrity of the
mail stream. 225 Anecdotal evidence leads one to reject that hypothesis,
however, for in recent years the Postal Service has damaged its own
reputation for honesty and reliability. During 1994, newspapers and
magazines carried numerous stories, some of them simply bizarre, of postal
workers who had destroyed or misappropriated mail.
In the Chicago area, caches of undelivered mail were found either
abandoned or burning. During the first three and a half months of 1994,
postal inspectors found nearly 70,000 pieces of undelivered mail in Chicago,
including 5,000 pieces of undelivered first class mail either stashed behind
223. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52,
224. Jeffrey M. Perloff & Michael L. Wachter, A Comparative Analysis of Wage Premiums and
Industrial Relations in the British Post Office and the United States Postal Service, in COMPETrrION
AND INNOVATION IN POSTAL SERVICES, supra note 112, at 115-121.
225. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
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the home of a dismissed postman or in the trunk of another postman's car.226
One postman was arrested and charged with delaying the delivery of the mail,
a felony carrying a maximum penalty of five years in prison.227 A month later,
firefighters battling a blaze found sacks of mail bearing Chicago addresses in
a postman's condominium. 228 Postmaster General Marvin Runyon subse-
quently dismissed the mail-burning incident in Chicago as an unfortunate
aberration that had attracted excessive attention.229 To the contrary, the
incidents in Chicago were not isolated events, for similar destruction or
misappropriation of mail was occurring in Washington, D.C.
In July 1994, the Postal Service disclosed that a Price Waterhouse study
revealed that Washington, D.C., had the worst mail service in the nation
during the quarter ending May 27, 1994, with only 60.6% of first class mail
arriving on time. 230 A week later, a surprise audit of three postal facilities in
greater Washington, D.C., by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service uncovered
more than three million pieces of undelivered mail, some of it dating to
February 1994, and most of it stashed in parked trailers. 231 The trade press re-
ported that "[p]ostal inspectors noted in their report that postal workers were
reluctant to report delays in handling mail because it could possibly ruin their
careers, subjecting them to harsh criticism by supervisors." 232
Although the cumulative effect of such press reports on the reputation of
the Postal Service is difficult to quantify, clearly they can only reduce
consumer confidence in this public enterprise. By comparison, a private firm
whose reputation is sullied by revelations of negligence or intentional
misconduct suffers a statistically significant loss in its stock price.233
Moreover, the loss exceeds the amount of expected criminal penalty or civil
damage award.234 Economists attribute that decrement of market value to a
reputational penalty that the capital markets impose on the firm in the
226. More Undelivered Mail Found in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 6.
227. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994) (delay or destruction of mail or newspapers).
228. Firemen Find Sacks of Mail, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1994, at A12.
229. Marvin Runyon, U.S. Postmaster General, Address to the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., Jan. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
230. Bill McAllister, Millions of Letters Undelivered; Local Facilities Held Unprocessed Mail,
WASH. POST, July 20, 1994, at Al; Bill McAllister, Post Office Acts to End Backlog; Overtime Is
Ordered for Area Mail Clerks Today and Sunday, WASH. POST, July 23, 1994, at A1; Bill Miller, Post
Offices Playing Catch-up; Workers on Overtime to Speed up Delivery, WASH. POST, July 24, 1994, at
B1.
231. Paul M. Alberta, Probers Find Mail Stashed in Trailers, DM NEWS, July 25, 1994, at 3,
available in LEXIS, Nexis News Library, DMNEWS file. The stashed mail included 2.3 million pieces of
bulk business mail and 800,000 first class letters in parked Postal Service trailers at Capitol Heights,
Maryland, more than 900,000 pieces of unprocessed mail at Merrifield, Virginia, and thousands of first
class letters at Washington's main post office. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993); Mark L. Mitchell & Michael T. Maloney,
Crisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in Promoting Air Travel Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 329
(1989).
234. Karpoff & Lott, supra note 233, at 796-97.
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expectation that the occurrence in question may signal that the firm's future
earnings may suffer as a result of further derelictions. Of course, no such
barometer exists for the market value of the Postal Service because it is
wholly owned by the federal government. No fraction of the ownership of the
Postal Service trades over a national exchange, and thus one cannot employ
the familiar event-study methodology from corporate finance to evaluate the
reputational harm to the Postal Service from revelations that its employees
had stolen or destroyed mail or had knowingly failed to deliver it in a timely
manner.
Private firms and the Postal Service differ in one other significant respect
in terms of how they bear the costs of criminal wrongdoing or negligence by
their employees. In a private firm, the harm to reputation is also borne
individually by managers through diminished lifetime earnings resulting from
their association with illegal or negligent conduct. In the Postal Service,
however, there is at least anecdotal evidence that intentional misconduct by
postal managers has failed to elicit significant penalties in terms of
termination or demotion, let alone civil or criminal prosecution. For example,
The New Yorker reported that the mail processing director for Chicago
spent two hundred thousand dollars of [Postal Service] maintenance
funds to refurbish her office suite with hardwood kitchen cabinets, a
marble bathroom, and an air-conditioner for each of the suite's seven
windows. Rumor has it that word of the renovation quite literally
leaked out when water from [her] whirlpool bath came through the
ceiling of the express-mail unit, two floors down.235
This postal manager was punished by being transferred, without any
reduction in pay, to a suburban Chicago facility where her husband was the
plant manager.236
E. Recapitulation
Public provision of the full range of postal services is no longer neces-
sary. Canada Post is not a natural monopoly. The absence of insurmountable
barriers to entry into postal delivery has allowed extensive provision of postal
services on a competitive basis and will continue to enable private firms to
provide additional mail services as regulation permits. In the absence of
Canada Post's statutory monopoly over letter mail, one would observe
competitive provision of all classes of mail service.
The contemporary rationales offered for continuing the public provision
of the full range of postal services are (1) to ensure ubiquity of service, (2) to
235. Jonathan Franzen, Lost in the Mail, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 24, 1994, at 72.
236. Id.
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allow for uniformity of pricing throughout the country, and (3) to ensure the
integrity of the mail stream. On closer examination, it is clear that private
firms, whose managers are obliged to maximize profit for their shareholders,
can be relied upon to a greater extent than Canada Post to supply secure deliv-
ery of letters and parcels. Further, in the presence of a funding mechanism for
universal service that is more attentive to the goal of maximizing consumer
welfare than is the current method of rate averaging, public control of postal
services would be unnecessary to ensure ubiquity of service and geographic
uniformity of pricing and quality. Therefore, the competitive provision of
letter mail would not compromise universal service, and it would seem more
likely to increase rather than decrease the integrity and efficiency of the mail
stream because of the superior incentive structures facing managers in private
firms.
IV. The Competitive Problems of Postal Pricing and Regulations
In reviewing the mandate of the Canada Post Corporation, it is imperative
to consider the competitive problems of postal pricing and regulations and for
Canadian policy makers to avoid the erroneous reasoning of the General
Accounting Office's study of the U.S. Postal Service. 237 Unlike a private firm
in a regulated industry in the United States, Canada Post is not subject to the
demanding oversight of a provincial public utility commission or a federal
regulatory agency. From a competitive perspective, the principal harm that
regulatory oversight can prevent is the misallocation of costs by Canada Post
from competitive classes of mail to letter mail, which is protected by a
statutory monopoly.
A. Preventing Anticompetitive Cost Misallocation by Canada Post
In regulated private industries one way of reducing the incentive and
opportunity for anticompetitive cross-subsidization is to replace cost-of-
service regulation with price caps.238 Canada Post, however, is not subject to
price caps. Moreover, it is doubtful that price caps would even be feasible for
Canada Post.
237. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: PRICING POSTAL SERVICES IN A
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT (1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
238. See BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 167-75, 276-85 (1991); DAVID E. M. SAPPINGTON & DENNIS L. WEISSMAN, DESIGNING
INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (1996); Ronald R. Braeutigam &
John C. Panzar, Diversification Incentives Under "Price-Based" and "Cost-Based" Regulation, 20
RAND J. ECON. 373, 387-90 (1989); Ronald R. Braeutigam & John C. Panzar, Effects of the Change
from Rate-of-Return to Price-Cap Regulation, 83 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 191 (1993).
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1. The Logic of Price Caps
Price caps resemble the phenomenon of regulatory lag-the general delay
in the responses of those approving Canada Post's rates to changes in cost or
market conditions.239 In addition, price caps may allow the firm pricing
flexibility and can reduce the cost of developing annual five-year plans.
Suppose that the firm's prices are set on the basis of current costs, and
the firm succeeds in reducing those costs substantially. Suppose further that,
say, two years elapse before the firm would be required to cut its prices corre-
spondingly. Then the firm would enjoy two years of superior profits as its re-
ward for improved efficiency. That process mimics a competitive market,
where a cost-cutting innovator enjoys superior but temporary profits. Those
higher profits end when rivals introduce their own cost-reducing innovations
and wipe out the competitive advantage temporarily enjoyed by the earlier
innovator.
The built-in regulatory lag at the heart of the price-cap approach must be
substantial because otherwise firms will have no effective incentive to
undertake the heavy costs and risks of innovation, and society will be the
loser. On the other hand, the lag, like the life of a patent, must not be infinite,
lest the consuming public be forced to forgo the benefits of lower prices that
the competitive market normally transmits to it.
Regulatory lag thus supplies the incentive required to elicit innovation
and productivity growth, with one critical exception. When inflation is sub-
stantial, regulatory lag delays the adjustment of output prices to compensate
for inflationary increases in nominal input costs. That delay squeezes the
profits of the regulated firm and undercuts both its incentive and its ability to
-invest in innovation. To deal with the inflation problem, the price-cap ar-
rangement uses the following familiar procedures. First, an initial price
ceiling is determined on the basis of stand-alone cost or a defensible proxy.
Second, the price ceiling is permitted to rise automatically each year by a per-
centage equal to the rise ofsome widely accepted index of inflation, such as
the consumer price index (CPI), after subtracting some number, X, from the
percentage increase in that price index. The arrangement is often referred to
as "CPI - X." Third, X is calculated from the industry's differential rate of
productivity growth in the past, or as a target rate of productivity growth for
the industry.
The logic of price caps is straightforward: The firm is permitted a per-
centage increase in the profit margin on its product that precisely equals the
amount by which its productivity performance exceeded the target. The oppo-
site is experienced by a firm whose productivity performance falls short of the
239. Indeed, although only Canada Post's monopoly rates are regulated, the corporation
attributed the consolidated net loss of $69 million that it reported for 1994-95 primarily to the delay in
rate action approval. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 5.
Vol. 14:1, 1997
Monopoly and the Mandate of Canada Post
target. In sum, under price caps, the firm whose productivity increase exceeds
the norm will enjoy higher returns exactly commensurate with its achieve-
ment, while the firm with poor productivity performance will automatically be
penalized correspondingly.
Price caps do more than induce the private firm to minimize its cost of
production. They also reduce the incentive for the firm to cross-subsidize new
lines of business through the misallocation of costs, for the firm may charge
up to its maximum price whether or not its accounting costs for the regulated
service change. In that manner, price caps attenuate the link that rate-of-
return regulation creates between the regulated firm's realized production
costs and its allowed earnings. Under rate-of-return regulation, the firm can
raise its allowed earnings whenever it can mischaracterize costs incurred in
the production of unregulated products as having been incurred in the produc-
tion of regulated products. Under price-cap regulation, however, the firm is
not allowed higher revenues from regulated services when the costs of those
specific activities rise; thus, the firm's ability to increase its earnings by as-
signing accounting costs from its unregulated services to its regulated services
is decreased. This decreased ability to profit from cost misallocation corre-
spondingly reduces the firm's incentive to attempt cross-subsidization.
2. Price Caps and Canada Post
In contrast to a private firm subject to price caps, Canada Post has the
potential to engage in anticompetitive cross-subsidization, although, as was
noted earlier, the Bureau of Competition Policy made no such finding in
authorizing Canada Post to acquire a 75% interest in Purolator.24° Canada
Post is not subject to any explicit price-cap regulation, and its rate changes
are authorized relatively quickly compared with public utilities commissions'
authorization of rate changes in the United States. 241 Indeed, the statutory
requirement that Canada Post publish its proposed rate modifications in the
Canada Gazette for public and governmental review for sixty days and that
the Governor in Council accept or reject the proposed rate regulation within
sixty days after Canada Post has responded to that review, while desirable on
grounds of administrative efficiency, incidentally contributes to the inability
of postal rates to resemble price caps. 242 Under such circumstances, not only
is Canada Post able to allocate common fixed costs arbitrarily across classes
of mail, but Canada Post is more able than a regulated private firm (such as a
U.S. local exchange carrier) to fail to attribute costs that can be causally
traced to a particular class of mail-particularly a class of mail, such as parcel
240. BUREAU NEWS RELEASE, supra note 147.
241. For proposals to subject the U.S. Postal Service to price caps, see Michael A. Crew & Paul
R. Kleindorfer, Pricing, Entry, Service Quality, and Innovations Under a Commercialized Postal
Service, in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 150, 161-67.
242. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 20 (1985) (Can.).
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post or overnight mail, for which Canada Post experiences substantial
competition. One would expect cost misallocation by Canada Post to be an in-
creasing function of the share of total costs that Canada Post asserts that it
cannot attribute to any particular class of mail.
B. Incorrect Measurement and Misallocation of Attributable Costs
Canada Post has several major classes of mail including lettermail,
admail, parcel service, and express mail. Such product categories are an
arbitrary segmentation of the mail market based on the characteristics of the
mailer. The categories exist to facilitate rate-setting and do not necessarily
conform to market segments that might be identified today for pricing and
marketing purposes.
1. Cost-of-Service Regulation of the U.S. Postal Service
A competitive firm sets price on the basis of its costs, its customers'
willingness to pay, and the anticipated prices that the firm's actual and
potential competitors will charge for their products. Unlike competitive firms,
Canada Post sets price on the basis of accounting measures of operating costs
and capital expenditures. In the case of the U.S. Postal Service, the Postal
Rate Commission begins by determining the Postal Service's revenue require-
ment on the basis of projected levels of demand for the various classes of
mail. Costs for a "test year" in the future are estimated on the basis of those
estimated demand levels, expected inflation rate, and estimated productivity.
If estimated total costs would exceed estimated revenues in the test year,
using existing rates, the Postal Rate Commission recommends rate increases.
The higher rates that would enable the Postal Service to break even reflect the
fact that demand would fall (and hence total costs would change) as rates rise
in accordance with the relevant price elasticities.
The prices established by a regulated firm that offers multiple products
and services, or that distinguishes between multiple customer classes, are
referred to as its rate structure. In the United States, after the Postal Rate
Commission determines the Postal Service's revenue requirement, it
addresses cost attribution and rate design. Each class must cover its attribut-
able costs and make at least some contribution to the recovery of institutional
costs. Understandably, great controversy surrounds the determination of
whether a cost is attributable to a particular class of mail and how institu-
tional costs should be apportioned among the various classes of mail. 43
243. For a discussion of the mechanics of a Postal Rate Commission case, see Crew &
Kleindorfer, supra note 241, at 160; George Hall, Regulatory Systems for Postal Rates, in REGULATION
AND THE NATURE OF POSTAL AND DELIVERY SERVICES, supra note 160, at 221. Because the Postal
Service has no shareholders, the form of cost-of-service regulation to which it is subject differs somewhat
from the cost-of-service regulation applied to private firms:
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2. Tests for Cross-Subsidies in Multiproduct Firms
A break-even regulated rate structure is said to be free of cross-subsidies
if and only if the prices satisfy the stand-alone cost test.244 Stand-alone cost
refers to the firm's long-run total cost of each service operated separately. The
stand-alone cost test requires that the revenues generated from either of two
services not exceed the stand-alone cost of providing that service. If the reve-
nues from one service do exceed its stand-alone cost while the revenues from
the other service do not cover stand-alone costs, then the first service is pro-
viding a cross-subsidy to the other service. 245 The test for cross-subsidization
demonstrates that the customers of the service providing the cross-subsidy
would be better off if they could obtain that service independently of the other
service.
A regulated firm's rate structure also can be said to be free of
cross-subsidies if and only if the prices satisfy the incremental cost test,
which is equivalent to the stand-alone cost test for a regulated rate struc-
ture.24 6 When applying the incremental cost test, revenues generated by each
service must cover the incremental cost of providing that service. 247 The
rationale for the incremental cost test is the requirement that each service
must generate revenues that at least cover the additional cost of producing
that service. If not, the other service is providing a cross-subsidy, and the
customers of the other service would be better off receiving their service inde-
pendently, at its stand-alone cost.
If a firm is regulated, it is desirable to design a rate structure that is free
of cross-subsidies. Otherwise, the economic incentives can lead to allocative
inefficiency. Customers receiving the subsidy do not observe the full econom-
ic costs of their service and consequently demand an inefficiently high
The testimony on the allowed rate of return, which is paramount in traditional utility
regulation, is not part of postal rate hearings. If the utility regulator allows a higher rate of
return, the stockholders potentially stand to benefit. In postal service regulation, however,
there is not the same direct concern with rate of return. The Postal Service has a break-even
requirement, which includes covering interest payments on its borrowing. The requirement to
establish an opportunity cost of capital, the basis of most rate-of-return testimony in utility
cases, is not present in postal rate cases.
Crew & Kleindorfer, supra note 241, at 160. For a discussion of cost-of-service regulation of private
firms, see SPULBER, supra note 161, at 271-79.
244. See, e.g., BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIG, supra note 161, at 352-53; BAUMOL & SIDAK,
supra note 172, at 81.
245. The definition of the stand-alone cost test is given in terms of two services. In the case of
more than two services, the test requires that no group of services subsidize any other group of services.
246. See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 172, at 57, 81-83; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS
APPLICATIONS AND THEORY 113-20 (1986).
247. The incremental cost test is defined here for only two services. In the case of more than two
services, the revenues generated by each group of services must cover the incremental cost of providing
that group of services.
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amount; customers providing the subsidy demand an inefficiently low amount
or seek bypass alternatives that may be uneconomic under some conditions.
Canada Post's rate structure has the potential to include various types of
cross-subsidies. One method of cross-subsidization is uniform pricing of
postal delivery regardless of origin or destination. Another method is
inappropriate accounting rules that misallocate costs. The differences in trans-
portation and delivery costs thus are not reflected in the postal rates.
Consequently, some mailers are subsidizing others. Other types of explicit
subsidies exist, including franking privileges and targeted discounts, such as
reduced postage rates on second class publishers' mail.
3. Attributable Costs and Institutional Costs
Putting aside explicit discounts, the method by which Canada Post's rates
are established may contain a number of implicit cross-subsidies. Those types
of cross-subsidies result from incorrect measurement of costs. One can dis-
tinguish two types of costs: attributable costs, which can be identified with
the costs of specific services, and institutional costs, which refer to joint and
common costs that cannot be attributed to any specific service.
Attributable costs generally are variable or "volume-sensitive" costs, such
as labor and vehicles that can be assigned to specific types of sorting,
collection, or delivery. Attributable costs also include fixed costs specifically
incurred for particular types of mail. Institutional costs are fixed overhead and
capital costs that are not volume-sensitive and do not correspond to any
specific sorting, collection, or delivery activities. If attributable costs are
correctly determined and prices for each service reflect those costs, arbitrary
allocations of joint and common costs (that is, institutional costs) yield
subsidy-free rate structures, 248 That proposition means that there is generally a
wide range of subsidy-free rate structures. If regulators incorrectly classify
some attributable costs as institutional costs, however, then accounting rules
for allocating indirect costs can easily produce cross-subsidization. For
example, until the U.S. Postal Rate Commission disapproved the practice in
1979, the U.S. Postal Service characterized advertising expenses for express
mail as institutional costs rather than attributable costs of that particular
service offering.2
49
To see the extent to which costs can be shifted to the institutional
category, consider the evidence from the U.S. Postal Service as shown in
Table 1. Of the U.S. Postal Service's twenty cost segments, sixteen have no
specific fixed costs, and three have insignificant specific fixed costs. The one
remaining category, "other accrued expenses" (cost segment 20), has only
248. SPULBER, supra note 161, at 127-131.
249. Opinion and Recommended Decision, at 256-57, app. J (Postal Rate Comm'n 1981) (No.
R80- 1) (discussing 1979 proceeding).
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4.9% specific fixed costs, mostly for equipment depreciation; but even here,
38.8% of costs are institutional. In other words, the Postal Service recognizes
practically no category-specific fixed costs. Therefore, almost all fixed costs
are treated as joint and common costs under the institutional cost label. Such
a categorization of costs is difficult to believe. How can almost 40% of total
cost be joint and common fixed cost while not even 1 percent of total cost is
category-specific? In other words, while the Postal Service's estimates of its
fixed costs are high, virtually all of those fixed costs are incurred jointly
across multiple cost categories, rather than being incurred on a segment-
specific basis.2
50
A possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that the "cost driv-
er" selected by the U.S. Postal Service is not the appropriate measure of the
sensitivity of costs to the economic activity. The Postal Service divides its
twenty cost segments into about sixty-five cost components and 100
subcomponents. 251 For each cost element, the Postal Service identifies a "cost
driver" that in its opinion "reflects the essential activity of that element. " 252
For example, "carrier access costs are driven by the number of stops made by
the letter carrier to deliver mail, and carrier 'load' costs are driven by pieces
of each mail shape that a letter carrier loads into [a] mail receptacle." 253 The
Postal Service calculates an "elasticity of cost" known as the "volume
variability" of the cost. The elasticity of cost is the percentage change in cost
divided by the percentage change in volume that "causes" the cost to increase.
Then, the Postal Service estimates marginal cost by multiplying the total cost
of the class by the elasticity of cost and dividing by volume. That compu-
tation estimates the change in cost for a change in volume. Attributable costs
are calculated by multiplying marginal cost times volume and adding any spe-
cific fixed cost.
254
250. Of course, those cost categories do not correspond to product lines. Analysis of cost
allocation by product line would shed further light on the likelihood of cross-subsidies between products.
251. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF USPS DEVELOPMENT OF COSTS BY
SEGMENTS AND COMPONENTS, tbl. 2, app. H (Calculating Postal Product Costs) (1994) [hereinafter
COSTS BY SEGMENTS AND COMPONENTS].
252. Id. at H-5.
253. Id. at H-4.
254. Id. at H-3.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
TABLE I
PERCENTAGE SUMMARY OF FY 1993 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
COSTS BY COST SEGMENT AND CLASSIFICATION
Attributable Costs
Cost Segment Total Total Total Specific- Institutional
Accrued Volume- Fixed
Variable
1. Postmasters 100.0 17.8 17.8 82.2
2. Supervisors




CAGA-J Post 100.0 87.2 86.7 .5 12.8
Offices
4. Clerks, CAG K
Post Offices 100.0 60.2 60.2 - 39.8
5. (Segment
Reserved) - - - - -
6. City Delivery
Carriers, Office 100.0 89.9 89.9 - 10.1
Activity
7. City Delivery
Carriers, Street 100.0 28.9 28.9 - 71.1
Activity
8. Vehicle Service
Drivers 100.0 47.3 47.3 - 52.7
9. Special
Delivery 100.0 52.4 52.4 - 47.6
Messengers
10. Rural Carriers 100.0 39.2 39.2 60.8
11. Custodial and
Maintenance 100.0 62.2 62.2 37.8
Services
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TABLE I (CONTINUED)
PERCENTAGE SUMMARY OF FY 1993 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
COSTS BY COST SEGMENT AND CLASSIFICATION
Attributable Costs




Service 100.0 20.1 20.1 - 79.9
13. Miscellaneous
Operating Costs 100.0 2.9 2.9 - 97.1
14. Purchased
Transportation 100.0 86.5 86.5 - 13.5
15. Building
Occupancy 100.0 70.2 70.2 - 29.8
Costs






and Regional 100.0 35.3 35.2 .1 64.7
Operations
19. General
Management 100.0 - - - 100.0
Services
20. Other Accrued
Services 100.0 61.2 56.3 4.9 38.8
Total 100.0 61.0 60.7 .3 39.0
SOURCE: COSTS BY SEGMENTS AND COMPONENTS, supra note 251, table 2, at
xi.
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The product of marginal cost times output, however, is an imperfect
measure of variable cost. Suppose, for example, that variable costs are given
by a quadratic function,
C(Q) = Q1,
so that marginal cost equals 2Q. Then, the product of marginal cost and
volume is MC x Q = 2Q 2 = 2C(Q). Such an approach doubles the level of
variable cost. Suppose instead that variable costs exhibit some economies of
scale,
C(Q) = Q2,
so that marginal cost equals .5Q-2. Then, the product of marginal cost and
volume is MC x Q = .5Q12 = .5C(Q), which cuts in half the level of variable
cost. Clearly, different specifications of the variable cost function can lead to
significant errors in estimating attributable cost, even if marginal cost can be
estimated accurately. 2
55
The U.S. Postal Service uses several methods to calculate the attributable
cost of a product. One approach, the "volume-variability" method, assigns
costs on the basis of the "cost driver" used to calculate the cost elasticity. For
example, the Postal Service uses the number of stops as the cost driver for
city carrier access.256 The Postal Service suggests that such a measure is pref-
erable to similar fully distributed cost methods using mail volume. An arbi-
trary choice of the cost driver, however, can significantly affect cost esti-
mates. Those effects, in turn, would entail variation in the cost estimates used
as a basis for Ramsey pricing, or any other regulated pricing methods for that
matter.
A second approach that the U.S. Postal Service uses to calculate the
attributable cost of a product is the "constructed marginal cost measure." The
Postal Service calculates the effect of a cost driver on cost, and the effect of
mail volume on the cost driver, to obtain the marginal cost of mail delivery in
terms of mail volume.25 7 Again, the accuracy of those estimates will affect the
results of Ramsey pricing calculations.
It is sometimes difficult to verify independently whether the cost drivers
selected by the U.S. Postal Service provide an accurate measure of the
economic activities of the enterprise. The ability to evaluate the economic
costs and returns from the Postal Service's activities is not only important for
regulatory purposes. The Postal Service needs to have economically accurate
255. The Postal Service recognizes this problem in calculating incremental cost, which involves
multiplying each unit by the marginal cost of that unit, id. at H-3. This method, however, does not appear
to be used for the attributable cost calculation.
256. Id. at H-6.
257. Id. at H-7.
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information about its products and services to manage its own operations,
determine the economic viability of its services, and prevent cross-subsidiza-
tion. Accurate internal business information is necessary to make efficient
investment decisions and to reduce or avoid economic losses.
4. The Difficulty of Preventing Cross-Subsidization by Canada Post
Canada Post is concerned that its prices and services are not competitive
with those of its competitors. Canada Post seeks the flexibility to expand its
range of services to compete with the large integrated carriers that have
developed the logistics management services offered by its nonpostal
competitors. 258 Such flexibility will surely include price flexibility.
Essentially, price flexibility of this type requires a shifting of institutional
costs away from markets in which Canada Post faces competition and toward
the market in which it holds a statutory monopoly. Given the high likelihood
of incorrect measurement of institutional costs and cost inefficiencies, such
cost shifting can easily lead to cross-subsidization of competitive activities by
Canada Post's captive customers.
There are few safeguards against such cross-subsidization. As explained
earlier, the U.S. Postal Service can carry out a cross-subsidization program by
following standard cost allocation rules if it can inflate the proportion of
institutional costs. Moreover, since Canada Post already has a presence in the
competitive markets for parcel post and express mail, it is difficult to
distinguish incremental costs devoted to those activities from growth in
institutional costs.
Market safeguards against cross-subsidization also are absent because of
Canada Post's statutory monopoly for letter mail. Competitive firms generally
cannot cross-subsidize because cross-subsidizing induces competitive entry.
If a service offered by a firm is contributing greater revenues than its stand-
alone cost, and if entry barriers are not excessive, then competitors will enter
the market and profitably supply that service. If the markets providing
subsidies are protected by statutory entry barriers, however, such competition
cannot occur. The statutory monopoly over letter mail delivery gives Canada
Post the potential to engage in cross-subsidization of competitive activities
and to pass the cost along to captive customers.
A profit-maximizing firm generally does not have an incentive to cross-
subsidize. Canada Post's behavior, however, suggests that it maximizes
volume, which rises as the corporation expands into new services or reduces
its prices relative to those of its competitors. Indeed, Canada Post has shown a
willingness to suffer significant losses-for the year ended March 26, 1994,
Canada Post's net loss was $259 million-while maintaining or increasing
volume, or while entering into or remaining in markets that private, competi-
258. CANADA POST CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 8, at 8.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
five firms have proven can be profitably served without government inter-
vention.259 Such behavior by Canada Post is not consistent with profit-
maximizing behavior (or, for that matter, its statutory mandate) but is consis-
tent with the objective of maximizing volume and employment.
5. Remedies for Cost Misallocation by Canada Post
Three principal remedies would prevent Canada Post from misallocating
cost. The first would be to open all postal markets to competition. Such a
policy would eliminate the possibility of cross-subsidies in the rate structure
of Canada Post and would wring out any of its economic inefficiencies be-
cause both of those conditions would create profitable opportunities for firms
to enter the market and offer lower prices.
A second remedy, not mutually inconsistent with the first, would be to
break up Canada Post along product lines to avoid any incorrect identification
of attributable costs as being joint and common.
A third remedy would be an alternative to the first two: remove Canada
Post from all markets but those in which it has a statutory monopoly so as to
avoid the possibility that subsidies would flow from protected to competitive
activities.
The policy recommendations in Part V will discuss the first and third
alternatives in greater detail.
C. Misuse of Ramsey Pricing Principles
In the United States a misuse of Ramsey pricing principles underlies the
GAO's recommendation that Congress grant the U.S. Postal Service the
freedom to price according to the inverse elasticity rule. The same deficiency
implicitly underlies Postmaster General Runyon's call for greater pricing
flexibility. This section reviews the concept of Ramsey pricing and then
shows why Canadian policy makers should avoid the errors of economic
reasoning that arise in the arguments of the GAO and the Postmaster General.
1. Ramsey Pricing
Ramsey pricing is a method of allocating fixed costs and joint and
common costs for a regulated firm or public enterprise. If it were feasible
financially, economic welfare would be maximized by setting the price of
each product equal to its marginal (or incremental) cost. If there are econo-
mies of scale, however, marginal cost pricing yields insufficient revenues to
cover the firm's total cost. Prices must therefore exceed marginal cost for the
259. PRICE WATERF1OUSE STRATEGIC REVIEW, supra note 14, at 13.
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firm to recover fixed costs and joint and common costs and thus continue to
supply the goods in question.
But every deviation of price from marginal cost creates some inefficien-
cy-first, because it provides an incentive for consumers to switch to those
goods whose prices are raised only modestly relative to their true marginal
cost, and second, because every rise in price restricts demand by cutting into
consumer purchasing power. Ramsey pricing denotes those second-best prices
that are Pareto optimal, subject to the requirement that they yield revenues
sufficient to cover the total costs incurred by the supplier of the products in
question. The damage to welfare is minimized if the firm can cover its reve-
nue shortfall through smaller increases in the prices of the goods whose
demands are elastic and through larger increases in the prices of goods whose
demands are comparatively inelastic. 26
Firms usually obtain Ramsey prices by maximizing the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus subject to the constraint that the revenues the
firm generates cover its costs. The standard approach to deriving Ramsey
prices, however, is itself subject to theoretical dispute because it ignores
effects on the distribution of income and assumes that the income effects of
price changes are insignificant. 261 Derivations of Ramsey prices often assume
that a change in the price of one of the firm's products will not affect the
demand for its other products.262 We review the derivation of Ramsey prices
in Section C of Part IV of this Article.
Moreover, if the firm incorrectly characterizes attributable costs as joint
costs (or vice versa), it will bias the Ramsey prices and preclude the welfare-
maximizing result, as Section C below demonstrates analytically. As noted
earlier, the apparent need to allocate institutional costs by using demand
factors grows in importance the more Canada Post is able, through ques-
tionable accounting practices, to count attributable costs as overhead. If in-
stead such costs were correctly attributed to specific activities of Canada Post,
many problems of cost allocation would disappear.
260. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). For
a review of the subsequent literature, see William J. Baumol, Ramsey Pricing, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE:
A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 49-51 (John EatweUl, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987);
William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM.
ECON. REV. 265 (1970).
261. See SPULBER, supra note 161, at 166-68; Martin S. Feldstein, Distributional Equity and the
Optimal Structure of Public Prices, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 32 (1972); Martin S. Feldstein, Equity and
Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: The Optimal Two-Part Tariff, 86 Q.J. ECON. 175 (1972).
262. The analysis of Frank A. Scott, Jr., Assessing USA Postal Ratemaking: An Application of
Ramsey Prices, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 279 (1986), and Roger Sherman & Anthony George, Second-Best
Pricing for the U.S. Postal Service, 45 S. ECON. J. 685 (1979), account for cross-elasticities of demand
and income effects. Analyses that assume zero cross-price elasticities of demand include Baumol &
Bradford, supra note 260; 0. A. Davis & A. B. Whinston, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Second
Best, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1965); Abba P. Lerner, On Optimal Taxes with an Untaxable Sector, 60
AM. ECON. REV. 284 (1970). See also Leonard Waverman, Pricing Principles: How Should Postal Rates
Be Set?, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSTAL RATES 7 (Roger Sherman ed., 1980).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
2. The Error Underlying the GAO's Recommendation That the U.S.
Postal Service Employ the Inverse Elasticity Rule
The GAO's recommendation that the U.S. Postal Service use the inverse
elasticity rule is theoretically flawed because the GAO would have the Postal
Service use estimates of the price elasticity of demand for first class mail that
are predicated on regulatory barriers to entry into postal markets. According
to the GAO, "[tihe Postal Service believes that demand factors should play a
major role in overhead cost allocation, whereas the [Postal Rate] Commission
places less weight on demand factors in its pricing decisions than the Postal
Service does. 263 In its report to Congress, the GAO recommends the
following:
[T]o give the Postal Service more competitive flexibility, GAO
believes Congress should reexamine the nine ratemaking criteria set
forth in the Postal Reorganization Act and consider amending them
to state that (1) in allocating institutional costs, demand factors-
including elasticities of demand-are to be given a weight that takes
into account the need to maintain the long-term viability of the Postal
Service as a nationwide full-service provider of postal services and
that (2) such use of demand factors will not be inconsistent with the
rate criterion requiring the establishment of a fair and equitable rate
schedule as long as each mail class recovers the direct and indirect
costs attributable to that service and makes some contribution to
institutional costs. Congress should also consider reexamining the
provisions of section 403(c) of the Postal Reorganization Act to
determine if volume discounting by the Postal Service would in fact
result in "undue or unreasonable discrimination" among mailer and
"undue or unreasonable preference" to a mailer.264
Even if a legitimate need for overhead cost allocation exists, the GAO has
applied demand-based pricing rules with deceptive oversimplification to the
operations of the U.S. Postal Service.
The demand for a firm's good is always more price elastic than the total
market demand for that good-unless the firm is a monopolist protected by
entry barriers, in which case the price elasticities of demand for the firm and
the market closely correspond. Generally, the firn faces a demand function
263. GAO REPORT, supra note 237, at 4.
264. Id. at 8-9.
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that reflects the reactions of competitors and potential entrants, which
increase price elasticity.
265
The application of demand-based pricing yields the familiar inverse
elasticity rule for all services:
(Pi - MCi)/Pi = K/fl i,
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is an index representing the five classes of postal
services. The other terms are defined as follows:
Pi = price of service i,
MC = marginal (attributable) cost of service i,
K = a constant reflecting the shadow price of the break-even
constraint,
17 g = the price elasticity of demand for service i.
The ratio of relative markups for any two services is governed therefore by the
inverse ratio of elasticities of those two services, for any two services i andj:
(Pi - MCi)
Pg = 7j.
(P, - MC,) 7
P.
The elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity
demanded divided by the percentage change in price. Let Di(Pi) represent the
demand function for service i, which depends on the price of service i. Then,
the elasticity of demand is defined by:
Di Pi) Pi, i = 1,2,3,4,5
5Pi Di (Pi)
The elasticity of demand is negative because a price increase lowers the
quantity demanded.
The current approach to calculating elasticities of demand for postal
services is based on estimates of the effect of a percentage change in postal
rates on the percentage change in postal volume for a given class of mail.
Professor George S. Tolley of the University of Chicago, whose testimony the
Postal Rate Commission has relied upon in ratemaking proceedings, had used
that method to estimate that the long-run elasticity of demand for first class
265. See William E. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 937, 945 (1981).
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mail in the United States is -. 188.266 This general type of estimation provides
a reasonably accurate description of the elasticity of the U.S. Postal Service's
demand although it has engendered some disagreement about the econometric
methodology used.267
The larger problem with the GAO's approach is that its estimates of the
price elasticities of demand for the various classes of mail are contingent on
the statutory barrier to entry that the Postal Service enjoys with respect to first
class mail. The price elasticity for first class mail is consequently lower than it
would be if there were no statutory monopoly. Professor William J. Baumol
and the present author have written about this same problem in
telecommunications regulation:
Application of Ramsey analysis to regulation is subject to [an]
important caveat because feasibility of the calculations is likely to
require them to take the pertinent demand elasticities as a given. In
the language of economics, these elasticities are then treated as exog-
enous. But regulators considerably influence the firm's demand elas-
ticity by their decisions and policies that affect the firm's actual or
potential competitors. Clearly, severe constraint of firms' entry and
pricing will somewhat immunize each enterprise from the
competitive pressures of others. That immunity from competition will
reduce the elasticity of each supplier's demand-that is, it will
reduce the loss of business that results from a rise in its prices. The
firm's price elasticity of demand thus must be said to be endoge-
nously determined by the regulatory process itself. With such
regulatorily influenced demand elasticities, it is not clear that Ramsey
prices calculated ex ante will be those necessary for economic effi-
ciency.268
When one applies that same reasoning to the U.S. Postal Service or Canada
Post, it is clear that demand-based pricing simply reflects the statutory
monopoly over letter mail and thus conveys little information about either the
consumers' willingness to pay for postal services or the opportunity costs of
alternative suppliers. Those elasticity estimates have precision without rigor.
That fallacy in postal ratemaking has not escaped notice in the past.
Professor Leonard Waverman of the University of Toronto wrote in 1980 that
the inverse elasticity rule "does not contemplate a firm that has one monopoly
service and competes with other firms in its other services., 269 He observed
266. Direct Testimony of George S. Tolley on Behalf of the United States Postal Service, Postal
Rate and Fee Changes (Postal Rate Comm'n 1994) (No. R94-1).
267. GAO REPORT, supra note 237, at 74-78.
268. BAUMOL & SIDAK, sup'a note 172, at 40-41 (footnote omitted).
269. Waverman, supra note 262, at 20.
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that the true elasticity of demand for U.S. first class mail would result in its
being assigned a much lower share of institutional costs:
The Postal Rate Commission has not dropped the inverse elasticity
rule. Utilizing the words "competition" or "value of service," the
commission sets rates above attributable costs in the same fashion as
in the past: first-class mail bears the great percentage of institutional
costs. Yet it is clearly first-class mail that faces the greatest potential
competition. Electronic funds transfer may, within the decade,
substantially lessen the number of first-class pieces carried by the
Postal Service. The loss of traffic will destroy the elaborate house of
cards on which the Postal Service and the commission have erected
their rate structure. Without first-class mail to carry most of the
common costs, rates will have to be increased for the other categories
of mail. 27
0
The U.S. Department of Justice similarly observed in 1977:
First class mail users have the most inelastic demand; by eliminating
competitive options through enforcement of the express statutes, this
inelasticity of demand is maintained. Therefore, the lion's share of
common costs is assigned to first class.27'
Still other economists in the 1980s debated in the academic literature the
extent to which, given these "cooked up" elasticities, demand-based pricing
rules are an unreliable way to determine the most efficient means of allocating
joint and common costs across postal customers. 272
The GAO also recognizes this problem, for it states that it has "assumed
that First-Class Mail is the most inelastic class because it has stronger
monopoly restrictions than the other classes of mail. 273 Nonetheless, the
GAO asserts--erroneously-that "the fact that elasticities may differ for
different classes of mail because the law allows for different amounts of
competition in those classes does not negate the validity of [the inverse
270. Id. at 24.
271. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHANGING THE PRIVATE EXPRESS LAWS: COMPETITIVE
ALTERNATIVES AND THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE 12 (1977).
272. See Frank A. Scott, Jr., The Pricing Policy of the Postal Service: Economics Misapplied, 4
J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251 (1985); William B. Tye, The Postal Service: Economics Made
Simplistic, 3 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 62 (1983); William B. Tye, The Pricing Policy of the Postal
Service: Policymaking Misunderstood, 4 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256 (1985).
273. GAO REPORT, supra note 237, at 66. See also id. at 30-31 ("Because of historical
experience and First-Class Mail protection from unrestricted competition by the Private Express Statutes,
postal ratemaking experts believe that this service has a relatively inelastic demand-i.e., the demand for
the service is not greatly affected by changes in postal rates."); id. at 64 ("[T]he relative inelasticity of
First-Class Mail may be largely due to the legal monopoly granted to the Postal Service.").
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elasticity rule] for ratemaking in the Postal Service."274 Instead, the GAO
argues that those elasticities should simply be taken as a given for pricing
purposes "[g]iven the market structure within which the Postal Service must
operate. '2 " The GAO makes that assertion despite its observation that the
econometric estimates of demand elasticities omit a number of factors:
The omitted variables might include private competitors' prices, the
quality of Postal Service products and services relative to those of its
competitors' entrepreneurship, product and marketing innovations
(e.g., advances in computers and telecommunications), and exoge-
nous changes in market conditions and in consumers' tastes and
needs. 27
6
Even if additional variables were included, as the GAO implies that they
should be, the estimation of demand elasticities still would fail to give an
accurate representation of competitor responses in the absence of the
regulatory barriers to entry enjoyed by the Postal Service.
3. The Correct Demand Elasticity for Computing Ramsey Prices for the
U.S. Postal Service
When we correctly assume that the artificially induced firm price elastici-
ty of demand for the U.S. Postal Service does not equal the actual market
price elasticity of demand, we can immediately see the fallacy of the GAO's
analysis concerning the suitability of the inverse elasticity rule. To illustrate
this point, suppose that entry were permitted into first class mail and that the
new entrants' actions could be described by a supply function S(PI) that de-
pended on the U.S. Postal Service's price for the service, P1. Then the Postal
Service's residual demand for the service would equal the difference between
the market demand D(PI) and the supply response of competitive firms:
D,(P,) = D(PI) - S(P).
Therefore, the price elasticity of demand for the Postal Service for first class
mail m7l can be expressed in terms of the entire market's price elasticity of
demand -'7, the Postal Service's market share s, and the (positive) price





276. Id. at 74.
277. The elasticity of supply is e = (3S(P,)15P1)(P1/S(P,)), which is positive because the supply
function is increasing in the price. The market share of the Postal Service is s = DI(Pt)ID(P).
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By statute, s must equal one because the supply of competing firms is held at
zero. In general, competition affects the elasticity of the firm's demand in a
more complicated manner-that is, it cannot simply be subtracted. A
complete analysis would need to take into account the costs of entry and
operation for competitors. In any case, competition will increase the Postal
Service's elasticity of demand, as it has clearly done in parcel post and
express mail.
In other words, the Private Express Statutes require that the Postal Service
have all the market for the delivery of first class mail. That requirement
causes the second term in the numerator to become zero-which prematurely
ends any inquiry by the GAO into the extent to which a fringe of competing
suppliers would enter the delivery of first class mail if allowed to do so. The
price elasticity of demand for first class mail is artificially low because the
Private Express Statutes forbid competition and thus arbitrarily drive down to
zero the price elasticity of fringe supply (which affects the relevant price
elasticity of demand). The low elasticity of demand that the GAO asserts to
exist for first class mail is then seen to be a regulatory contrivance--one
preordained by the Postal Service's historical resistance to allowing
competitive entry into first class mail through relaxation or repeal of the
Private Express Statutes.
Another way to understand the elasticity of demand for first class mail is
to consider the effects of having a substitute service. The products of the U.S.
Postal Service are differentiated from those of private carriers in terms of
brand name, pickup locations, service quality, and other features. Suppose
that there is a competitive substitute for first class mail. Let D(PI, Ps)
represent the demand for the Postal Service's first class mail, evaluated at the
price of first class service, P1 and the price of the competitive substitute, Ps.
The own-price elasticity demand for first class mail is
6cD(Pi,Ps) P1
P,P,) - 5Pl D(PI,P)
The entry barriers established by the Private Express Statutes can be modeled
as a very high price for the competitive substitute. Under reasonable
conditions, a higher price for the substitute will lower the elasticity of demand
for first class mail.278 Therefore, legal and regulatory restrictions on substi-
278. The effect of the price of the substitute on the elasticity of demand is:
5n(PiPs)l & Ps = [Pu/(D(PPs))2 ] x [D(P,Ps)D 1 2(PI,Ps)- DI(Pi.Ps)D2(PIPs)l.
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tutes for first class mail have the effect of artificially reducing the elasticity of
demand for first class mail.
Although the GAO reportacknowledges that the statutory monopoly over
the delivery of first class mail lowers the price elasticity of demand for such
mail,279 the GAO nonetheless fails to recognize that this critical fact
invalidates the reasoning by which the GAO reaches its conclusion that the
inverse elasticity rule should govern the allocation of institutional costs to the
various classes of mail. We have no reason to suppose (as the GAO evidently
does) that pricing according to the inverse elasticity rule would maximize
consumer welfare when the Postal Service's price elasticity of demand for
first class mail is an artifact of legal barriers to entry.
A. Michael Spence, a respected economist who is the current dean of
Stanford Business School, argued in 1983 that the distorting effect of the
Private Express Statutes on the price elasticity of demand for first class mail
does not by itself imply that first class rates derived from the inverse elasticity
rule are excessive:
It is certainly true that if the private express statutes were dropped,
the elasticity of demand for USPS services would rise in first class
mail, and that would tend to reduce those rates as they emerge from
optimal pricing formulas. But the conclusion that the first class mail
rates were artificially high does not follow. The issue is whether it is
a good thing or not to expose USPS to competition. That issue is not
decided by describing correctly one of the consequences of allowing
competition. Therefore, without prejudging the whole issue, to repeal
the private express statutes on the ground that they artificially create
a demand facing the Postal Service for first class mail that is
inelastic, would be to do it for the wrong, or at least an insufficient
reason. 
280
Spence raises a.valid point, but it is not one that detracts from the conclusion
that the GAO's proposal for inverse elasticity pricing by the Postal Service is
analytically flawed. That same conclusion would apply to Canada Post.
As shown in Part 11, one cannot credibly conclude that Canada Post is a
natural monopoly. Competition is therefore an available option if Parliament
should conclude, in response to the question that Spence poses, that it is
desirable to expose Canada Post to competition. The analysis in Part Il
Because the two products are substitutes, a higher price for the substitute would increase demand for first
class mail, D2(P1,Ps) > 0. If the cross-price effect is either positive or not too small, D,2(P,,Ps)
[D,(PiPs)D2(PiPs)ID(Pi, Ps)], then the demand for first class mail becomes less elastic as the price of
the substitute rises.
279. GAO REPORT, supra note 237, at 62-63.
280. A. Michael Spence, Regulating the Structural Environment of the Postal Service, in THE
FUiUE OF THE POSTAL SERVICE, supra note 160, at 197, 206-07 (emphasis in original).
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showed that a government-owned postal monopoly has no advantage over
competition in the provision of postal services. In short, the Private Express
Statutes and Canada Post's mandate to maintain "basic customary postal
service" directly harm consumer welfare, especially since the alternative of
competition is readily available in each case. 28 1 That is not to say that repeal
of the Private Express Statutes--or Canada Post's mandate-is justified
simply because such statutory prohibition on entry has the secondary effect of
distorting Ramsey pricing principles when applied to the Postal Service in the
simplistic manner advocated by the GAO. In short, the foregoing analysis
provides a sufficient reason not only to reject the recommendations of the
GAO's 1992 report, but also to repeal the Private Express Statutes.
D. The U.S. Postal Service's Pursuit of "Profit"
Since regulators first addressed Ramsey pricing in ratemaking
proceedings several decades ago, the concept has invited the recurrent but
uninformed criticism that it is tantamount to a rule allowing the supposedly
regulated monopolist to charge whatever the traffic will bear.282 That criticism
is incorrect because it ignores that Ramsey prices are constrained to yield
profits no higher than the competitive earnings level, while the profits of a
price-discriminating monopolist are unconstrained. Prices that are set subject
to a profit constraint will be considerably lower than those adopted in the
absence of such a constraint.283
The irony of the GAO's 1992 report on postal pricing, and of the U.S.
Postmaster General's 1995 call for greater pricing flexibility, is that they are
in essence recommendations for the U.S. Postal Service to approximate not
Ramsey pricing but rather unconstrained price discrimination by a firm
having a guaranteed monopoly in one market and facing competition in its
other markets. The Postal Service has demonstrated a proclivity to character-
ize, through incorrect measurement or misallocation, an inordinate share of its
total costs as institutional costs. The GAO would then place a greater share of
those inflated institutional costs on customers of first class mail-according
to its specious interpretation of the inverse elasticity rule, which fails to adjust
for the fact that the price elasticity of demand for first class mail is artificially
low because the statutory monopoly on the delivery of first class mail
excludes any possibility of competitive entry.
In short, the economic essence of what the GAO and the U.S. Postmaster
General advocate is that the U.S. Postal Service should be allowed to charge
first class customers whatever the traffic will bear and charge other customers
281. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-10, § 5 (1985) (Can.).
282. See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 172, at 52-53 & n.2 (citing American Tel. & Tel. Co. 64
F.C.C.2d 131, 1 1121-24 at 469-70 (1976)).
283. Id.
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of other classes of mail prices that undercut private competitors. Thus, unre-
stricted pricing combined with statutory monopoly will yield monopoly
profits for the Postal Service. Expansion into competitive markets will yield
additional profits if there are economies of scope between the provision of
first and third class mail and the provision of expanded services such as
parcel post and express mail. If such expansion is subsidized, however, the
expansion creates economic inefficiencies. Such a set of outcomes would
comport with the Postmaster General's prediction that, if the Postal Service
were granted greater pricing flexibility and freedom to enter new markets, the
enterprise "could become a profit center for the federal government." 28
4
Despite Canada Post's recent losses, its chief executive officer has similarly
asserted that the corporation's mandate is "to earn a return that is
commensurate with that earned by firms of similar size, facing similar risks.
.10-12%."285
In what sense will the U.S. Postal Service earn such "profits"? The Postal
Service typically runs losses that accrue as institutional costs to be recovered
in the future through postal revenues.286 In May 1995 the postmaster general
stated: "We are going to pay down billions of dollars in prior year deficits and
debt, and put the Postal Service on solid financial footing." 287 That recovery
of prior years' losses represents another way in which attributable costs are
mischaracterized as institutional costs: some portion of last year's
unrecovered attributable costs return in the current year as institutional costs
because of the Postal Service's determination to recover prior years' losses. If
the Postal Service earns revenues in excess of costs, those returns will
presumably accumulate as a surplus. As noted previously, the Postal
Service-unlike Canada Post-pays no dividends. Continuation of cost-of-
service postal ratemaking means that positive net earnings at best will serve to
delay rate increases. The Postal Service has an incentive to absorb this "free
cash flow" by increasing expenditures or investing in future expansion of
postal services.288
Unlike privately owned companies, the U.S. Postal Service has no market
test for those investment decisions. Competitive firms must take into account
the cost of capital in their investment decisions. The Postal Service is
relatively immune from such considerations. Were it not for the fact that the
Postal Service is losing money, it would be difficult for those reasons to
284. Marvin Runyon, U.S. Postmaster General, Address to the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., Jan. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File.
285. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52, at 4.
286. Opinion and Recommended Decision, Postal Rate and Fee Changes, at 11-16 to 11-24 (Postal
Rate Comm'n 1994) (No. R94-1).
287. Postmaster General Marvin Runyon, Address at the National Postal Forum, Nashville,
Tennessee 2 (May 8, 1995) (on file with author).
288. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 Am. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PRoC. 323 (1986); MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 192, at
492-94.
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evaluate the extent to which it was generating profits. Moreover, the Postal
Service's reporting requirements differ substantially from those of publicly
traded companies. Since the Postal Service employs accounting methods that
diverge from those used by private firms and is highly secretive about its
costs, it would be difficult to compare its profits with the accounting profits
of private companies.
E. Implications
The postal ratemaking process has unusual cost allocation and accounting
procedures that bear little relationship to economic theory. Conventional
regulatory safeguards to prevent cost misallocation are absent from postal rate
regulation. The statutory monopoly over letter mail conferred on Canada Post
by the Canada Post Corporation Act intentionally suppresses competition and
consumer choice. In the United States, the Postal Service's understanding of
Ramsey pricing principles is faulty. In considering Canada Post's mandate,
the Canadian government should avoid the GAO's erroneous interpretation of
those principles.
When factors relating to statutory monopoly are considered in the postal
ratemaking process, it becomes clear that reliance on inverse elasticity pricing
could maximize consumer welfare only by sheer accident. It is far more likely
that postal rates set in such a manner would harm consumer welfare and
competitive markets for postal services. It would be a mistake to employ
inverse elasticity pricing until postal regulation has been dramatically
reformed, or until Canada Post has been commercialized and its statutory
monopoly repealed.
V. Policy Recommendations
The foregoing analysis implies that Parliament will be forced to consider
four alternatives for the future of Canada Post: acquiesce, privatize, commer-
cialize, or strengthen public oversight. Of those four, commercialization may
be most attractive in terms of being a politically feasible option that would
appreciably enhance economic welfare.
A. Acquiescence
The preceding discussion of Canada Post's privileges, performance, and
objectives explains why it is inadvisable on public policy grounds for
Parliament to allow Canada Post to continue its expansion in competitive
markets that are ably served by private firms. Continued expansion by
Canada Post threatens not only the well-established delivery markets such as
parcel post, express mail, newspapers, and commercial mailing services, but
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also emerging communications markets such as on-line services and
electronic commerce. Expansion into robust private markets without such
counterbalancing constraints as private ownership or competition in the
delivery of letters is unlikely to enhance consumer welfare.
The competitive Canadian postal markets do not need a government-
owned participant with a monopoly business. Many carriers serve the
Canadian express mail market, including Federal Express Canada, United
Parcel Service, Loomis Courier, Canpar Transport, and Purolator (as it did
even before Canada Post bought a majority interest). The market for parcel
delivery is served by numerous companies, including Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., DHL Worldwide Express, United Parcel Service, Roadway
Services, and Pittston.
The more Canada Post is permitted to expand in, and into, competitive
markets, the more such acquiescence will increase both the incentive and the
opportunity for Canada Post to engage in anticompetitive cross-subsidization
of its provision of competitive services.
Part IV shows that given the opportunity, a company could achieve such
anticompetitive results in two steps. First, it could continue to distort and
misallocate the attributable costs of providing competitive service by charac-
terizing those costs instead as institutional costs that should be spread across
all categories of its enterprise according to Ramsey pricing principles. Sec-
ond, it could distort the inverse elasticity rule, which follows from Ramsey
pricing analysis, and thus would overstate the proportions of the institutional
costs that should be allocated to the monopoly business. That overallocation
of institutional costs to the monopoly business occurs and will continue to
occur because the price elasticity of demand estimated by the privileged entity
for the monopoly business fails to consider the fact that a statutory barrier to
entry artificially prevents competitive firms from entering the market under
any circumstances, even when the company sets a price for that service far in
excess of marginal cost. Although Canada Post is not explicitly rate-regulated,
it still has these incentives while preparing its budgets. In the United States,
the Postal Service's inference of price inelastic demand for first class m~iil is
the direct consequence of the monopoly that such public enterprise enjoys.
For those reasons, one must conclude that on grounds of economic
welfare the least attractive choice that one could make concerning Canada
Post would be to acquiesce to the continued expansion of the enterprise into
commercial markets.
In its report the Review concurs with this position. It views Canada Post's
"aggressive" entry into competitive markets as creating the "serious anomaly
[of] an unregulated public sector monopoly engag[ing] in unrestrained
competition with the private sector." 289 It further observes that the anomaly
was "intensified" by yet another anomaly: that of a "corporation carry[ing]
289. MANDATE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 20.
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out its competitive activities on the basis of cost-accounting processes that
[were] neither publicly open, transparent, reliable nor in any possible way
confidence-inspiring."
290
Thus, the Review recommends that Canada Post withdraw from
competing with the private sector in areas outside its core postal service
mandate. It defines the core postal services as being those that "the private
sector could not provide as well in accordance with the principles of universal
service and uniform pricing .... 291 According to the Review, the provision
of such core services constitutes "the public policy reason for the
corporation's existence." 292 Specifically, the Review seeks the withdrawal of
the corporation from the courier business, unaddressed admail, the operation
of business support or mailing centers, electronic products and services, and
non-postal merchandise retailing.
The Review finds that Canada Post is an unfair competitor in the
unaddressed admail and courier services and as such has a detrimental impact
upon the private firms in those markets. The Review reasons that "the
corporation's misallocation of costs constitutes a form of cross-subsidization,
whether intentional or otherwise" and that Canada Post's exploitation of a
publicly funded network is "seriously unfair" because it artificially gives the
corporation "a pricing advantage over [its] competitors. 293
The Review recommends the divestiture of Purolator but distinguishes
expedited mail as a service that the corporation can continue to provide. The
Review reasons: "Disallowing Canada Post from providing pick-up service
[alone would] remove it from direct competition with courier companies,
without significantly affecting its ability to exploit cost economies of scale
and scope within its existing lettermail network. 2 94 In addition, the Review
recommends that Canada Post withdraw from the provision of unaddressed
admail services. The Review reasons that such services do not "fall within
Canada Post's public policy responsibilities." 295 Nonetheless, the Review
does exempt the provision of such services to governments and their elected
members by Canada Post.296
Electronic products and services were also included in the list of
activities from which the Review seeks Canada Post's removal. But the
Review qualifies its recommendation, stating that "in the event that the
corporation identifies any electronic product or service that meets a
demonstrable public policy need and that the private sector is unable or
unwilling to provide in a way that would adequately serve the public interest,
-290. Id. at 22.
291. Id. at78.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 122.
294. Id. at 85.
295. Id. at 84.
296. Id. at 85.
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Canada Post should be able to apply to the government for permission to
provide that specific product or service.' 297 The Review identifies the
problem with the corporation's participation in the electronic services market
as its expenditure of resources in an area in which it has no special expertise
or advantage.298
The Review cites to four overarching reasons for its recommendation that
Canada Post withdraw from those competitive markets. First, it states that
Canada Post's participation in those markets in competition with private
firms placed the Canadian government in "an untenable position with regard
to fair treatment of the private sector. '299 The Review adds that "[flor
understandable reasons related to past behaviour, secretiveness and lack of
accountability, there is . . . no scenario under which private companies
[would] believe that Canada Post is a fair competitor."3°° Second, the Review
observes that Canada Post's participation in competitive markets distracts it
"from concentrating on the pursuit of excellence in the provision of core
postal services, and distorts] its corporate culture by whipsawing it between
public service and purely commercial orientation."301 Third, it reasoned that
the corporation's presence in competitive markets was "unnecessary in view
of the private sector's now-developed capacity to provide the same services,
and therefore they [were deemed] inconsistent with the Government's
determination only to be involved in those activities for which there [was] a
public policy reason. 30 2 Finally, the Review stated that such participation
was "non-essential from a financial point of view, because other options
exist[ed] to maintain an adequate revenue base for the corporation without the
problems that its involvement in competitive activities engender[ed]."3 °3
B. Privatization
Privatization is the opposite pole on the spectrum of policy options
available to Parliament. If Parliament privatized Canada Post and removed its
exclusive privilege over letter mail, the problems of potential anticompetitive
cross-subsidization would eventually disappear. Canada Post's reservoir of
monopoly rents earned from letter mail would dry up and would thus deny the
firm the ability to cross-subsidize competitive services. Privatization would
force Canada Post to maximize profits rather than employment or some other
297. Id. at 86.
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objective, and competition would force this multiproduct firm to adopt subsi-
dy-free prices for its various services.
304
The Review is not convinced that a privatized Canada Post, without
exclusive privilege over lettermail, "would be an improvement on keeping
postal service in the public sector."305 It reasons that both a regulatory agency
and subsidies still would be required for the provision of postal services so
that remote and sparsely populated regions would be serviced by the private
postal entity.30 6 It adds that a regulatory regime would be required to
coordinate the provision of postal services because the Review envisages a
fragmented postal system resulting from the removal of the exclusive
privilege. 30 7 According to the Review, the resultant fragmentation would be
caused by the privatized corporation focusing its competitive efforts in the
high-density urban areas to the exclusion of the rural and remote regions.
30 8
The Review cites the decisions of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand,
which it calls "countries with exceptional enthusiasm for privatization" not to
privatize their postal services and the fact that very few Canadian companies
have expressed enthusiasm for a privatized Canada Post as support for its
position.309 In addition, the Review expresses its concern that the transition
from a public to a private postal system would be marked by a protracted
period of disruptions requiring substantial adjustments over several years. It
believes that this disruption, in turn, would harm Canadian business. 31
0
C. Commercialization
A public enterprise can be commercialized even if it is never privatized.
The legal and economic analysis in the preceding sections suggests that a plan
for the commercialization of Canada Post should include at least the removal
of statutory entry barriers and other privileges, and relief from incumbent
burdens.
1. Remove Canada Post's "Exclusive Privilege" and Any Other
Explicit or Implicit Privileges of Public Ownership
Parliament should remove Canada Post's exclusive privilege over letter
mail. The general rule in the Canadian economy is that attempted mo-
nopolization is a crime, but when it comes to delivering letters, it is attempted
304. For a thoughtful discussion of the practical business steps that would be required to privatize
the U.S. Postal Service, see Bert Ely, Privatizing the Postal Service: Why Do It; How to Do It, in FREE
THE MAIL: ENDING THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 117 (Peter Ferrara ed., 1990).
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competition that is the crime. If Canada Post wishes to compete on the merits
with private firms, it should not be allowed to do so behind the protection of a
statutory monopoly.
Parliament also should eliminate Canada Post's exclusive access to
customers' mailboxes, wherever it exists. Parliament should mandate that
bonded entrants into postal service markets receive equal access to Canada
Post's increasing number of cluster mailboxes. Furthermore, Parliament
should mandate that bonded private firms receive equal access to mailboxes
in apartment buildings. Greater access would increase competition across
various existing and future classes of mail by lowering entry costs for com-
petitors and lowering the consumer's cost of switching from Canada Post to
another firm. Eliminating that small but widespread entry barrier would facili-
tate competitive services and increase customer convenience.
More generally, Parliament should specify by statute that, for as long as
Canada Post remains publicly owned, it shall be subject to all laws generally
applicable to private firms and shall have no special privileges or immunities
arising from its public ownership. Canada Post should not be permitted to
benefit from its government-owned status in terms of tax privileges, reduced
costs of borrowing, minimal accountability to shareholders, and a
government-funded pension plan.
In addressing the issue of exclusive privilege, the Review states that it
was the price the Canadians had to "pay for maintaining universal postal
service at affordable rates.",311 The Review adds that the privilege "exists by
the will of Parliament on behalf of the people of Canada., 312 The Review
notes that only three countries had abolished similar privileges and that most
others subscribed to the position that universal postal service with uniform
rates would not be possible without such exclusive privilege. As for Canada,
the Review observes that if the privilege was removed, "private companies
would concentrate on competing in high-density urban areas ... and ignore
rural and remote markets." 313 It explains that because of great distances,
sparse populations, low mail volumes, and numerous distribution points rural
Canada "offer[ed] little prospect of profitability. 3 14 The Review reasons that
"[b]ecause Canada Post's postage rate must blend the cost and revenue
requirements of serving both urban and rural areas, and handling both local
and forward mail, private firms serving only the most lucrative urban markets
would be able to undercut the corporation's rate in those markets and siphon
away business. 315 The Review argues that Canada Post would then find itself
still having to service its extensive network in order to provide universal
service with both lower volumes and revenues. The eventual result, the
311. Id. at70.
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Review concludes "would be dramatically higher postage rates, an end to
universal service or, most likely, some combination of both. Even worse,
[Canadian] postal system would be irrevocably fragmented. 3 16
To preserve universal service without the grant of an exclusive privilege
to Canada Post, the Review foresees the need for "some form of subsidy
scheme to permit a financially-weakened Canada Post to continue to serve
non-urban areas or to induce private companies to serve them instead. 317 In
addition, the Review envisages the need for a regulatory agency with a
mandate of "ensur[ing] that an increasingly fragmented postal system did not
descend into chaos. 31 8
2. Relieve Canada Post of Its Universal Service Obligation and Other
Incumbent Burdens
If Canada Post is to be stripped of its unique statutory privileges as a
condition of being allowed to compete freely against private firms, it should
also be relieved of its unique statutory obligations. The most conspicuous of
those obligations is the universal provision of mail delivery.
There is a powerful efficiency-based argument for removing the
incumbent burdens of Canada Post, an argument distinct from concerns about
symmetry or fairness. As a matter of political economy, it would be easier to
remove Canada Post's exclusive privilege and other barriers to competition in
postal services if Parliament were simultaneously to remove the putative justi-
fication for those special privileges. Because universal service is the most
prominent of Canada Post's incumbent burdens, it is also Canada Post's
strongest justification for the maintenance of its exclusive privilege and the
continuation of its expansion into competitive markets.
From the perspective of maximizing consumer welfare, it would be
regrettable if the commitment to providing mail service to rural and other
high-cost segments of the population were to have the effect of denying all
segments of the population the substantial benefits that would flow from
having multiple providers of letter mail service rather than only one provider.
There is also a jurisprudential argument against funding universal service or
other incumbent burdens through the creation of artificial monopolies. The
cross-subsidies built into uniform postal rates are an implicit regime of taxes
and appropriations. Taxing and spending is properly the role of Parliament.
The magnitude of the subsidy to rural recipients of mail should be apparent
from an explicit line item in the budget; it should not be an amount that can
be inferred only by undertaking extensive economic analysis of the cross-
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Despite the repeated efforts of scholars to convey those messages in a
variety of regulated industries, including postal delivery, rate structures
containing cross-subsidies have endured in such industries. If one hopes to
influence public policy in the real world, it is therefore necessary to take ac-
count of how actual political constituencies and institutions may prevent the
achievement of reforms that would increase economic welfare. By enacting
legislation to fund universal postal service in a way that does not depend on
the artificial creation of a monopoly, Parliament would deny opponents of
postal commercialization their most politically effective argument for
retaining Canada Post's exclusive privilege over letter mail and other special
privileges.
There are at least two general means by which Parliament could decouple
universal service from the postal monopoly. First, Parliament could send
postal subsidies directly to consumers in rural areas. Those subsidies could
even be means-tested, if one's low income were considered to be more
important than one's rural address. Those customers would then be billed
directly by the carrier of last resort for the high cost of what might be called
"terminating access," to borrow a telecommunications concept. The lower
basic stamp, price that would result would not include the surcharge for
delivery to costly, remote areas. A second means would be for the government
to solicit bids from private firms to deliver mail to remote areas for a specified
contract term. The winning bid would be that which proposed to provide
service at the lowest subsidy from the government. If Parliament were to
adopt either approach, it could end the false rhetoric that Canadian consumers
must tolerate a monopoly to have universal service.
The Review identifies postal service to be "a vital public good and a key
element of [Canadian] communications infrastructure" and as such "it should
be universally available.' 319 The Review cites to the fact that some 95% of the
Canadian population still sent letters, cards, and bills through the mail.3 20 It
rejects the economic inefficiency argument against both universality and
uniformity of rates as not being a "sufficient criterion for sound public
policy." 321 The Review agrees with Canada Post's position that its central
public policy function was to continue providing affordable universal
lettermail service at uniform rates. The Review goes even further and
recommends that ". . . providing universality of service and uniformity of
price for lettermail be regarded as integral elements of the mandate of Canada
Post Corporation [and that] in any future amendments to the Canada Post
Corporation Act, the obligation to provide universal service at a uniform rate
for lettermail be explicitly included as part of the corporation's mandate., 322
319. Id. at 67.
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D. Stricter Public Oversight
If commercialization of Canada Post is not politically feasible along the
lines just described, then Parliament must select the remaining option of
substantially increasing public oversight of Canada Post. That option contains
three necessary .elements. One is to create an independent body to regulate
Canada Post's rate-setting procedures. The second is to eliminate from
Canada Post's objectives the goal of generating profits for the federal
government. The third is to limit strictly the lines of business in which
Canada Post may operate.
1. Establish a Regulatory Oversight Commission
If Canada Post remains a government-owned corporation with a statutory
monopoly over letter mail, then Parliament should create a regulatory
commission with full powers to set rates, to order public disclosure of Canada
Post's costing methodologies, and to prescribe modification of those
methodologies as needed. In other words, Parliament should establish a
stricter watchdog to ensure that cross-subsidization of competitive businesses
with monopoly rents never occurs. That regulator must have the power to
order whatever structural relief (such as divestiture of operating units,
separate subsidiaries, accounting separations, and so forth) it deems necessary
to regulate Canada Post in a manner that advances the purposes of public
provision of postal services.
The Review opines that oversight of Canada Post by yet another
regulatory agency creates more difficulty than value. First, it reasoned that the
corporation was "vehemently opposed to third-party regulation."323 The
Review cites to a statement made at the Review's public meeting in Ottawa
by the President of the corporation, Mr. Clermont, where he said in part:
"What they want is an American system, one that will tie our hands in such a
way that it will give them free reign to capture our markets or at least the ones
that are lucrative and destroy the only Canadian competitor large enough to
compete effectively all across our nation."
324
Second, in light of Canada Post's opposition, the Review observes that
establishing a new regulatory regime to oversee the postal service would have
the net "effect of adding new controversies and pressures to those already
existing in the regulatory field." '325 It explains that because decisions of
regulatory bodies are routinely appealed to the Cabinet, rulings of a postal
service regulatory agency will, most likely, suffer the same fate. Such appeals,
323. Id. at 71.
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the Review finds, would be even more probable in the case of the postal
regulatory agency, "since the corporation would be certain to invoke
'commercial sensitivity' in insisting that detailed data on which the rulings
were based not be made public." 326
Third, the Review reasons that a regulatory agency could exasperate an
already complicated relationship between the government and the
corporation. It argues that "[t]he Government's rights to direct the corporation
as its shareholder and owner could easily come into conflict with the need to
maintain an arm' s-length approach toward matters subject to regulation."327
Finally, the Review, pointing to the U.S. experience, suggests that "the
regulatory process is by its nature time-consuming and costly."328 In support
of that proposition the Review quotes from the Canadian Competition
Bureau's submission to it, in which the Bureau stated that "[t]he processes of
the U.S. Postal Rate Commission have been judged as expensive,
bureaucratic, inefficient and wasteful. 329
2. Clarify That It Is Not Canada Post's Mission to Be a "Profit
Center" for the Federal Government
If Canada Post is not commercialized, Parliament should ensure that
Canada Post will not attempt to generate profits for the federal government by
displacing the business of efficient rivals in competitive markets. This
recommendation may run counter to Canada Post's possible plan to issue
shares to its employees; but such a plan is itself an endorsement for
privatization. In other words, if the beneficial incentive effects of employee
ownership are a large concern, then the better course of action is to distribute
some or all shares to the employees and make the securities immediately
marketable to third parties, thereby privatizing Canada Post.
The economic justification for public enterprise is either that there is a
natural monopoly or that there is an uncompensated or untaxed externality.
Neither is present in the case of postal services, or at least not present in
sufficient magnitude to necessitate public ownership as the appropriate form
of government intervention. Economic theory does not justify public
enterprise on the ground that the government can make a profit competing
against private firms. The government's source of funds is better confined to
its use of the more politically transparent means of taxing the private
economic activity of firms and households.
One of the Review's recommendations is that Canada Post "concentrate
on excellence in its core lettermail responsibilities as long as they are relevant,
326. Id.
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and be treated as a sunset industry and phased out if the time ever comes
when they are no longer relevant."330 In reaching that conclusion, the Review
rejects two key premises on which Canada Post's defense of its participation
in the competitive markets rested. In its submission to the Review, the
corporation thus articulated its first premise: "[T]he scale and scope of the
distribution network required for universal letter services in turn requires that
[Canada Post] also provide competitive services that generate contributions in
excess of their incremental costs and thus defray overhead and other fixed
costs of the network."'331 In the same submission the second premise was
stated as follows: "As lettermail business is lost to courier, electronic and
other alternatives, [Canada Post] can best protect itself by supplying
competitive services that meet market needs." 332 The Review finds "Canada
Post's strategic vision of expanding into competitive activities to supplement
revenues and to protect itself against anticipated lettermail volume declines is
imperfect in practice and in principle. 333
The Review observes that Canada Post's emphasis on competitive
activities has not yielded "sufficient revenues to allow the corporation to
consistently achieve break-even status. 33" Thus, the Review concludes that
the corporation's strategy of defraying fixed costs of its network through its
entry in competitive markets had worked poorly.335 Moreover, the Review
notes that the corporation's aggressive expansion in competitive markets as
an unregulated public monopoly has made it an unfair competitor vis-a-vis
private firms. The Review identifies as "perhaps [the] most fundamental
shortcoming" of Canada Post's entry into competitive markets its
shortchanging the core public policy responsibilities that constitute the reason
for its existence.336 The Review states that "[t]he corporation exists,
ultimately, to deliver the mail, and yet its most visible preoccupations in
recent years has been with the establishment and expansion of various
competitive activities. 337
3. Remove Canada Post from Markets That Are Demonstrably
Competitive
In any market where private firms already provide adequate mail or
communication services, there is no need for Canada Post. Parliament should
clarify Canada Post's mandate to remove the firm by statute from any such
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market, or Parliament should delegate such removal power to the proposed
regulator. Where markets are satisfying consumer demand through the
competitive provision of postal services, no market failure is present that
could justify government intervention, let alone intervention in the extreme
form of a publicly owned enterprise. The antitrust laws are sufficient to
ensure that postal markets that are demonstrably competitive today will not be
monopolized or cartelized by private firms when Canada Post exits the field.
Conclusion
The path to more competitive and innovative mail service in Canada does
not involve facilitating predatory cross-subsidization by a government-owned
monopolist. In other words, the proper policy is not one of Parliamentary
acquiescence to the unconstrained diversification and corporate aggrandize-
ment of Canada Post. At the other extreme, privatization is efficient on
economic grounds but may be politically unfeasible.
Given those considerations, the policy most conducive to greater
economic welfare is likely to be the commercialization of Canada Post. Such
a reform package would remove the exclusive privilege over letter mail and
other statutory privileges enjoyed by Canada Post; it would also relieve
Canada Post of its incumbent burdens. This set of reforms might eventually
lead to the privatization of Canada Post although it need not. Indeed, privat-
ization would be unconscionable on economic grounds if it failed to provide
for removal of Canada Post's exclusive privilege.
In the words of Canada Post's chief executive officer, given a level
playing field, "let the market place decide who should be in the game and
who is best."338 Parliament should indeed level the playing field, which means
removing all of Canada Post's unique privileges and burdens. If, on the other
hand, Parliament declines to commercialize Canada Post, the government's
remaining option will be considerably more invasive. Canada Post's
continued enjoyment of statutory privileges will necessitate much greater
oversight of the enterprise by a new postal regulator. It will be necessary for
Canada Post to divest operations in demonstrably competitive lines of
business, and for federal enforcement authorities to engage in closer antitrust
oversight to ensure that Canada Post does not abuse its lawful monopoly over
letter mail. The least acceptable course of action is for Parliament to continue
to do nothing in the face of Canada Post's expanding empire.
338. Clermont Testimony, supra note 52.
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